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Introduction
Slurring is a type of hate speech meant to harm individuals simply because of their group membership. It not only offends but also
causes oppression. Slurs have some strange properties. Target groups can reclaim slurs, so as to express solidarity and pride. Slurs
are noted for their “offensive autonomy” (they offend regardless of speakers’ intentions, attitudes, and beliefs) and for their “offensive
persistence,” as well as for their resistance to cancellation (they offend across a range of contexts and utterances). They are also noted
for their “offense variation” (not all slurs offend equally) and for the complicity they may induce in listeners. Slurs signal identity
affiliations; they cue and re-entrench ideologies. They subordinate and silence target members and are sometimes used non-
derogatorily. Slurs raise interesting issues in the philosophy of language and linguistics, social and political philosophy, moral
psychology, and social epistemology. The literature on slurs also connects to socio-psychological theory, critical race theory, and legal
philosophy. There are two main types of questions: those of a social nature and those of a linguistic nature. In the first category are
questions such as, “What social and psychological effects do slurs create and how do they create them?” In the second category we
ask, “What sort of linguistic properties do slurs have and what do those properties tell us about theories of language, reference and
meaning?” Researchers also try to accommodate the answers to these questions with a unified theory (i.e., to explain how the linguistic
properties of slurs bring about harm). Others are concerned with the social significance of slurs, their relation to harm and
discrimination, and how to remedy them. One related question is whether slurring utterances are constitutive of (or cause) harm. This
underpins debates on free speech and specifically the legal question of whether slurs should be regulated speech. Other linguistic
problems are definitional. How do slurs differ from pejoratives, insults, swear words, and offensive behavior? Within the realm of
evaluative language, how do slurs compare to Fregean “coloring” and hybrid terms such as moral, “thick,” and evaluative terms?
General Overviews
Sosa 2018 is a wide-ranging collection of contributions on slurs and offensive terms more generally. Other useful resources are
Symposium on Slurs, Special Issue on Slurs, and a section on “Emotions, Language, and Hate Speech” in Forlè and Songhorian 2016.
Further papers on slurs and non-derogatory uses are collected in Cepollaro and Zeman 2020. Finkbeiner, et al. 2016 is a collection of
contributions on various linguistic features of pejoratives and slurs. McGowan 2019 is a book-length monograph examining the
mechanisms underpinning racist hate speech, sexist speech, pornography, and micro-aggressions and makes the case that oppressive
speech not only causes but also constitutes harm. Kennedy 2002 is a monograph dedicated to the N-word, highlighting its variety of
uses in a multitude of contexts, including in the courtroom, on campus, in appropriated uses in-group, in the arts and entertainment
fields, and as an argument against abandoning the N-word. Allen 1983 is a book-length sociological analysis of the origins and
evolution of slurs in the context of the social relations conducive to ethnic conflict. Anderson, et al. 2013 offers a general overview
discussing racial slurs, hate speech, and generics in the context of the relationship between language and race. Hom 2010, Anderson
and Lepore 2013, DiFranco 2014, and Bianchi 2013 provide surveys and overviews of general features of slurs and their relationship to
pejoratives.
Allen, Irving L. The Language of Ethnic Conflict: Social Organisation and Lexical Culture. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1983.
A sociological and historical survey of ethnic slurs in American slang. Explains their origins as rooted in cultural conflict between
groups. Some slurs derive from loaned words between groups in conflict and others from an in-group use by inverting the original
meaning. Argues that there is a correlation between the number of slurs, the historical population size of a group, and the group’s
contact and conflict with other groups.
Anderson, Luvell, and Ernie Lepore. “A Brief Essay on Slurs.” In Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy and Psychology.
Edited by Alessandro Capone, Franco Lo Piparo, Marco Carapezza, 507–514. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2013.
A brief and accessible description of notable problems that slurs raise and their argument as to how prohibitionism solves these
problems. Among these are variable offense, use of slurs in reports or by speakers not having contempt for targets, and restrictions on
appropriation.
Anderson, Luvell, Sally Haslanger, and Rae Langton. “Language and Race.” In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Language. Edited by Gillian Russell and Delia Graff Fara, 753–767. New York: Routledge, 2013.
An introduction to the moral and epistemic harms done with racial slurs, hate speech, and racial generics. Has the advantage of
bringing together disparate phenomena, but the methodology and theoretical frameworks—prohibitionism, speech-act theory, generics
semantics—are only partially connected.
Bianchi, Claudia. “Slurs: Un’Introduzione.” In Senso e Sensibile: Prospettive tra Estetica e Filosofia del Linguaggio. Vol. 17.
Edited by Paolo Leonardi and Claudio Paolucci, 41–46. Rome: Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2013.
A general introduction to slurs, surveying three approaches: semantic, pragmatic, and the non-linguistic theory of prohibitionism. Written
in Italian.
Cepollaro, Bianca, and Dan Zeman. Special Issue: Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs. Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (2020).
A collection of articles focused on non-derogatory uses of slurs. Some focus more specifically on the outcome and/or process of how
slur words are reclaimed by target group members. Others offer more general accounts, focusing on the instability of slurs, the difficulty
in blocking them, and other controversial cases. Editors’ Introduction: “The Challenge from Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs” (pp 1–10).
DiFranco, Ralph. “Pejorative Language.” In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by James Fieser and Bradley
Dowden, 2014.
A general survey of the theories about and the main characteristics of slurs and pejoratives.
Finkbeiner, Rita, Jörg Meibauer, and Heike Wiese, eds. Pejoration. Linguistics Today 228. The Netherlands. 2016.
A collection of articles covering the state of the art in the linguistic research on pejorative constructions. Some papers are concerned
with identifying pejoration in different linguistic domains. Others are concerned with the question of what types of speech acts and uses
are made with slurs.
Forlè, Francesca, and Sarah Songhorian. “Emotions, Language, and Hate Speech.” In Special Issue: Emotions, Normativity,
and Social Life. Phenomenology and Mind 11 (2016).
A collection of short papers on various properties (e.g., the evolution of slurs, their offense variation, their behavior under negation, and
their relation to evaluative language and generics.
Hom, Cristopher. “Pejoratives.” Philosophy Compass 5.2 (2010): 164–185.
A survey of the linguistic features of pejoratives, and the major theories—nominalism, contextualism, inferentialism, presupposition,
conventional implicature, and thick semantic externalism.
Kennedy, Randall. Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word. New York: Vintage, 2002.
Argues for the currency of the N-word in terms of a pragmatic difference in meaning depending on who says the word in what context.
Traditionally used as insult, the N-word can also be appropriated or used non-derogatorily in arts and entertainment. Discusses the
effects of using the N-word on jurors’ verdicts, the risks and benefits of hate speech regulations on campus, and weighting arguments
about whether to preserve or abandon the word.
McGowan, Mary Kate. Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
Explains how harm occurs in oppressive acts involving subordination, domination, discrimination, harassment, and marginalization via a
mechanism of “covert exercitives.” Exercitives enact changes to what is subsequently permissible both in conversational game and the
social game in which it is embedded. Exercitives are covert when they do not rely on the speaker’s authority to introduce norms or
intentions to do so. Thus, oppressive speech can alter norms in a given practice or activity to be ones that prescribe oppressive
behaviors.
Sosa, David, ed. Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
A collection of articles covering the state of art in the philosophical research on slurs. Some papers address the question of whether
slurs’ offense derives from their meaning and whether this is a semantic or pragmatic meaning. Others address the question of how
slurs relate to swear words, taboo words, and pejoratives.
Croom M. Adam. (ed). Special Issue on Slurs. Language Sciences 52 (2015): 1–260.
A collection of articles, some on the linguistic nature of slurs, in particular on their semantic and pragmatic properties. Other articles are
on their social and psychological nature.
Hom, Christopher. (ed). Symposium on Slurs. Analytic Philosophy 54.3 (2013): 293–377.
A collection of articles that brings together a range of theoretical positions on the linguistic and social nature of slurs, with a focus on
semantics versus pragmatics.
The Linguistic Nature of Slurs
The linguistic question is whether the effects of slurs are due to what they mean, and if so, whether that meaning is semantic or
pragmatic. The consensus is that slurs express negative attitudes by casting targets in a negative light, and this explains why they are
offensive. Content-based theories try to capture this as a matter of derogatory content. Non-content-based theories deny this,
explaining the offense as a matter of sociological or psychological facts. The hard question for content-based theories is, “What kind of
content do slur-based attitudes contribute to the overall meaning of slurring utterances?” Various answers have been given. Saka 2007,
Richard 2008, and Jeshion 2013 (all cited under Expressivist Semantics) model slurs as expressing contempt, whereas for Camp 2013
(cited under Non-Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts) they signal allegiance to derogatory perspectives, and for Nunberg 2018 (cited
under Pragmatic Accounts) they signal affiliation with a bigoted group. For Hom 2008, slurs encode group stereotypes; for Hom and
May 2013 (both cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts), they work as fictional terms. Slurs have also been modeled by
analogy with expressive meaning and moral terms. Content-based theories are divided into semantic and pragmatic accounts.
Semantic accounts explain slurs’ offense as derived from linguistic properties they have by virtue of their conventional meaning or
broadly semantic content. Pragmatic accounts claim it derives from contextual factors or conversational phenomena governing the use
of slurs. However, as in the more general semantics-pragmatics, there is controversy as to what falls within the scope of semantics and
whether or not that is restricted to truth-conditional content. For some, the derogatory content exhausts the meaning of a slur term: they
are thus univocal, non-hybrid theories. For others, the derogatory content is just one component mixed with others as part of a complex
package: they are thus hybrid theories. Hybrid and non-hybrid theories differ with respect to the nature of the derogatory content and
whether or not they take this content to affect the truth conditions of the utterances in which a slur term occurs. This feature is often
contrasted with the contribution made by a slur’s neutral counterpart. For Hom 2008 and Hom and May 2013, slurs and neutral
counterparts differ in meaning, with the derogatory content exhausting the slur’s truth-conditional contribution. By contrast, for Richard
2008, Jeshion 2013, Camp 2013, and Bach 2018 (cited under Non-Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts), slurs and neutral
counterparts are truth-conditionally equivalent. For them, the slur’s derogatory content is non-truth conditional. This reflects different
intuitions about truth. Camp 2013 (cited under Non-Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts) and Jeshion 2013 (cited under Truth-
Conditional Semantic Accounts: Critique of Truth-Conditional Accounts) allow that sentences containing slurs can be true. Hom 2008
and Hom and May 2013 claim that they are always false. Saka 2007 and Richard 2008 argue they are neither true nor false. The
underlying question is whether responding “true” or “false” to slurring utterances makes one complicit in bigotry.
Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts
Hom 2008 and Hom 2012 provide a truth-conditional semantics that captures the derogatory content of slur terms as a property of the
contemptibility of targets. This framework is later developed in Hom and May 2013, Hom and May 2014, and Hom and May 2018, which
consider the role of oppressive ideologies in the semantics of slurs. The key hypothesis here is that slurs work like fictional terms. This
explains the distinction from neutral counterparts: slurs and neutral counterparts target the same individuals but do not refer to the
same individuals. They differ in extension and thus differ in meaning. The motivation for a distinction in meaning comes from the fact
that moral facts falsify the predication of a slur: no one deserves to be subject to negative moral evaluation merely because of one’s
group membership, thus the utterance is always false. The derogatory content exhausts the truth-conditional contribution made by a
slur term. Diaz-Leon 2019 develops an inferentialist truth-conditional account in response to critiques to Hom-style semantics. Other
accounts provide different arguments for the distinction between slurs and neutral counterparts. For example, DiFranco 2015 argues
that compound slurs raise difficulties for semantic accounts that take slurs and neutral counterparts to be equivalent, whereas Caso and
Lo Gercio 2016 argues that these cases can in fact be accommodated. Other accounts focus on the truth-aptness features of slurs.
Picardi 2006 argues that slurs and pejoratives contribute the derogatory content as part of what speakers are saying. Miščević 2011
argues that slurs are truth-apt and explains their semantics as containing stereotypical properties. Neufeld 2019 develops an
essentialist model of the semantics of slurs and shows that this view receives robust empirical support from cognitive psychology.
Caso, Ramiro, and Nicolas Lo Gercio. “What Bigots Do Say: A Reply to DiFranco.” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5.4
(2016): 265–274.
Argues that the compositional slurs that DiFranco raises as counter-examples to truth-conditional theories of slurs are not in fact
counter-examples and can be explained in a way that does not deviate from those theories.
Diaz-Leon, Esa. “Pejorative Terms and the Semantic Strategy.” Acta Analytica (2019): 1–12
Defends an inferentialist/descriptivist account. Argues that a slur’s meaning is a description to the effect that targets ought to be subject
to discriminatory practices because of negative properties they are assumed to have according to an ideology. Claims bigots and non-
bigots share the same inferential dispositions when grasping the meaning but have different beliefs about whether or not anyone
satisfies the description. Claims superiority over Hom’s radical semantic externalism in solving problems that Hom’s approach cannot.
DiFranco, Ralph. “Do Racists Speak Truly? On the Truth-Conditional Content of Slurs.” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4.1
(2015): 28–37.
Argues that compositional slurs (“slanty-eye”) and iconic slurs (“ching chong”) encode truth-conditional content about the target (e.g.,
diet, attire, and physical features) other than group membership. This poses a problem for neutral counterpart theories that hold that
slurs and neutral counterparts are truth-conditionally equivalent, since a uniform treatment of their truth-conditions becomes
problematic.
Hom, Christopher. “The Semantics of Racial Epithets.” Journal of Philosophy 105.8 (2008): 416–440.
Defends combinatorial externalism, which says that a slur semantically encodes group stereotypes, ideologies, and institutions of
oppression. This is a descriptive propositional content predicated by targets. Argues that slurs are always false because no one is
inherently contemptible for belonging to a target group. Sets out eight criteria of adequacy, arguing that extant theories fail to meet them
all but that an externalist semantics explains them all.
Hom, Christopher. “A Puzzle About Pejoratives.” Philosophical Studies 159.3 (2012): 383–405.
Argues that slurs and pejoratives raise an issue insofar as some occurrences seem to make a truth-conditional contribution, whereas
others are best accounted for non-truth-conditionally. Argues that extant theories fail to provide a unified solution for the puzzle,
whereas a truth-conditional semantic analysis is fit to explain that slurs and pejoratives are a semantically unified class.
Hom, Christopher, and Robert May. “Moral and Semantic Innocence.” Analytic Philosophy 54.3 (2013): 293–313.
Argues that slurs predicate contemptibility of targets. This includes factual, affective, and normative properties inherited from false
ideologies about target groups. Because no one falls under the extension of the concept encoded by a slur, this generates null
extensionality. This captures semantically what is wrong with slurs, thus vindicating the moral innocence thesis that no individuals ought
to be evaluated negatively based on their group membership.
Hom, Christopher, and Robert May. “The Inconsistency of the Identity Thesis.” Protosociology 31.4 (2014): 113–120.
Argues against identity-based theories that allow slurs and their neutral counterparts to be truth-conditionally equivalent. Explains
instead slurs’ offense as residing in truth-conditional content.
Hom, Christopher, and Robert May. “Pejoratives as Fiction.” In Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs. Edited by
David Sosa, 117–140. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues that slurs are fictional terms whose meaning and reference are fixed relative to a supporting oppressive ideology. The ideology
creates an illusion so that people under its grip are misled into thinking that targets are worthy of contempt. Thus, slurs encode a
pejorative concept PEJ(G) glossed as “ought to be the target of negative moral evaluation because of being a member of a group G.”
Miščević, Nenad. “Slurs and Thick Concepts—is the New Expressivism Tenable?” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10.32
(2011): 157–180.
Defends, contra Richard 2008 (cited under Expressivist Semantics), a cognitivist approach in which slurs are meaningful and truth-apt.
Their semantics consists in ascribing negative properties to the target that are delineated through an associated stereotype.
Neufeld, Eleonore. “An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs.” Philosophers’ Imprint 19.35 (2019).
Argues that slurs are a species of similar terms in that they encode “mini-theories,” which represent an essence-like element that is
causally connected to a set of negative stereotypical features of a social group. But because there is no essence that is causally
responsible for stereotypical negative features of a social group, slurs have null extension, and hence slurring sentences are either
meaningless or false.
Picardi, Eva. “Colouring, Multiple Propositions and Assertor Content.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (2006): 49–72.
Argues that pejoratives contribute to “at-issue” content and that this is what enables the possibility of “refusing to endorse” an assertion
with a pejorative.
Critique of Truth-Conditional Accounts
Critical discussions of semantic accounts involve several points of contention (e.g., the distinction versus equivalence between slurs
and their neutral counterparts; the nature of the derogatory content; intuitions about truth and variability in projection behavior). Jeshion
2013 raises objections for stereotypes semantic accounts. Sennet and Copp 2015 raises objections for semantic accounts that endorse
a semantic distinction between slurs and neutral counterparts. Marques 2017 raises objections for the fictionalist account of slurs
presented in Hom and May 2018 (cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts). Diaz-Legaspe 2018 is concerned with uses of
slurs with a restrictive reference. Croom 2015 raises objections for semantic accounts committed to the equivalence between slurs and
neutral counterparts. Cepollaro and Thommen 2019 raises objections for truth-conditional accounts on the basis of slurs’ projective
behavior.
Cepollaro, Bianca, and Tristan Thommen. “What’s Wrong With a Truth-Conditional Account of Slurs.” Linguistics &
Philosophy 42.4 (2019): 333–347.
Argues against a truth-conditional account of slurs by treating cases where projection fails as meta-linguistic uses of slurs. Argues
against Hom and May 2013 (cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts), which attempts to explain why speakers are misled into
thinking that the derogatory content projects out by treating slurs as fictional terms.
Croom, Adam M. “The Semantics of Slurs: A Refutation of Coreferentialism.” Ampersand 2 (2015): 30–38.
Argues that slurs and their neutral counterparts are not co-referential and thus differ in meaning. Introduces the notion of a “conceptual
anchor” to explain empirical data about the relationship between slurs and their neutral counterparts.
Diaz-Legaspe, Justina. “Normalizing Slurs and Out‐Group Slurs: The Case of Referential Restriction.” Analytic Philosophy
59.2 (2018): 234–255.
Argues that when slurs have a more restrictive reference than neutral counterparts this poses problems for theories that take the two to
be co-referential or truth-conditional. Distinguishes two kinds of slurs: (a) “normalizing” slurs and (b) “out-group” slurs. Only (a) have a
restricted reference.
Jeshion, Robin. “Slurs and Stereotypes.” Analytic Philosophy 54.3 (2013): 314–329.
Rejects the idea that stereotypes should be incorporated into the semantics of a slur. Audience members need not have a similar
stereotype. While many stereotypes contain positive or neutral features, slurs are exclusively negative. Some slurs have no
corresponding stereotype (e.g., the Yiddish “Shiksa”). Acknowledges that group stereotypes are often raised to salience by slurring
utterances but explains this as a perlocutionary effect.
Marques, Teresa. “Pejorative Discourse is Not Fictional.” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2017): 250–260.
Argues against Hom and May 2018 and its fictionalism about pejoratives on the basis that there is no analogy between pejorative and
fictional discourse: the former implicates that the speaker is committed to racist ideologies, but the latter does not implicate that the
speaker is committed to the fiction. Discusses the status of non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses.
Sennet, Adam, and David Copp. “What Kind of a Mistake Is It to Use a Slur?” Philosophical Studies 172.4 (2015): 1079–1104.
Debunks a series of semantic arguments establishing that slurs and neutral counterparts differ in extension (and thus differ in meaning)
and extends objections to arguments establishing they have the same extension. Rebuts Hom and May 2013 (cited under Truth-
Conditional Semantic Accounts), which objects to non-semantic views, in particular the conventional implicature account of slurs.
Non-Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts
These are hybrid accounts that incorporate the derogatory content as part of a more complex package including other components.
One constant of this package is a descriptive component asserting group membership, which slurs typically share with their neutral
counterparts. The question is this: “What else beyond predicating group-membership do slurs seek to achieve?” Theories differ in how
they treat this additional, “other” component, and whether or not it infects intuitions about truth. For Hornsby 2001, it involves a gesture.
For Camp 2013 it involves a perspective. For Bach 2018 it is an evaluative side comment. For Predelli 2013; Predelli 2017; Corazza
2018; Diaz-Legaspe, et al. 2019; and Diaz-Legaspe 2019 the “other” component involves features of register. And for Jeshion 2013
(cited under Expressivist Semantics), this “other” component is an expressive one. Despite these differences in the nature of the “other”
component, there is broad consensus that the derogatory component does not make any difference to the truth conditions of the
sentences in which slurs appear. It is thus a non-truth-conditional component, and the truth of the descriptive content is enough to judge
slurring utterances as true. For others, however, no slurring utterance can ever be true, such that responding “true” or “false” to a
slurring utterance is enough to make listeners feel complicit (e.g., Hornsby 2001, Saka 2007 [cited under Expressivist Semantics], and
Richard 2008 [cited under Expressivist Semantics]).
Bach, Kent. “Loaded Words: On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Slurs.” In Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs.
Edited by David Sosa, 69–85. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues that slurs differ from neutral counterparts in that they impute contemptibility to targets. This is an implicit, evaluative side
comment loaded into the slurs’ semantics. A slur thus expresses two independent propositions in a compressed way: the evaluative
proposition is a function of the classificatory proposition. Contrasts loaded semantics with hybrid expressivism, which takes slurs to
express a dual content: a descriptive content and an expressive content.
Camp, Elisabeth. “Slurring Perspectives.” Analytic Philosophy 54.3 (2013): 330–349.
Argues that slurs conventionally signal a derogatory perspective on the target group. The perspective is based on stereotypical
properties and images of and attitudes toward targets. The perspective is non-defeasible, resists cancellation, limits deniability, induces
cognitive and social complicity in listeners, and so is treated as semantic (though not truth-conditional).
Corazza, Eros. “Contexts, Biases, and Reflexivity.” In Language, Evolution and Mind: Essays in Honour of Anne Reboul.
Edited by Pierre Saint-Germeir, 87–107. London: College Publications, 2018.
Recasts Predelli 2013 in terms of a pluri-propositionalist theory. The character of a slur term contributes to the “official content” or what
is said, whereas the bias contributes to the “reflexive content” or a generalized conversational implicature.
Diaz-Legaspe, Justina. “What is a Slur?” Philosophical Studies (2019): 1–22.
Considers various candidate definitions of the term “slur.” Argues in favor of the register approach to slurs. According to this approach,
slurs are referential terms for groups marked by register features that link their use to contexts where these groups are discriminated
against. According to the author, uses of slurs constitute discriminatory acts.
Diaz-Legaspe, Justina, Chang Liu, and Robert J. Stainton. “Slurs and Register: A Case Study in Meaning Pluralism.” Mind &
Language (2019): 1–27.
Defends a pluralist-meaning account. Argues that slurs are lexically marked with particular features of register (i.e., usually marked as
slang and vulgar) and always marked as impolite and derogatory. The result is a pluralist-meaning account that combines: (a) a
descriptive component identifying the target’s group membership; (b) an expression of negative attitudes; (c) a use-theoretic component
that concerns a rule-of-use regarding the fittingness to a discourse situation; and (d) lexical metadata.
Hornsby, Jennifer. “Meaning and Uselessness: How to Think About Derogatory Words.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy:
Figurative Language 25.1 (2001): 128–141.
Argues against both expressivist and inferentialist treatments of slurs in favor of a representationalist view. Argues that using slurs is
like making an offensive gesture while uttering their neutral counterpart. This is no different than ordinary descriptive terms
accompanied by a tone, inflection, or gesture in order to communicate further negative attitudes.
Predelli, Stefano. “Derogatory Slurs.” In Meaning Without Truth. By Stefano Predelli, 96–112. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013.
Develops a theory of bias according to which slurs come equipped with a character and a bias. The bias is a constraint conventionally
assigned to a slur term that fixes its relationship to the context of use of that term, namely a context in which the speaker expresses a
negative attitude toward the target. This is a non-truth-conditional dimension of meaning.
Predelli, Stefano. “Boo Semantics: Radical Non-Factualism and Non Truth-Conditional Meaning.” In Meaning, Context, and
Methodology. Edited by Sarah-Jane Conrad and Klaus Petrus, 117–139. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2017.
Builds on Predelli 2013 and analyzes slurs (and register more generally) in terms of constraints on the class of contexts of appropriate
use.
Expressivist Semantics
There are two ways of capturing the expressive dimension of slurs. One is via the connection with evaluative talk, including moral terms
(e.g., “good” and “wrong”) and thick terms (e.g., “courageous” and “lewd”). The other is via the connection with expressive terms,
including pejoratives (e.g., “prick” and “moron”), expletives (e.g., “damn”), swear words and vulgarities (e.g., “fuck” and “shit”). The first
avenue explores the connection with the literature in meta-ethics in order to extend a hybrid expressivist framework of moral terms to
slurs. What these terms have in common is that they are hybrid terms, of which one is an expressive or evaluative component. In the
case of slurs, in addition to identifying the target’s group membership, the speaker is expressing an attitude of contempt toward targets.
Differences arise depending on how we understand “expressing” (e.g., what the expressive content amounts to; how it relates to the
classifying, descriptive content; and whether or not it affects truth-conditions). Saka 2007 offers one of the first expressivist accounts of
slurs. Richard 2008 is concerned with characterizing the nature of the contemptuous way of thinking involved in slurs and capturing
their illocutionary potential. Richard 2018 is concerned with incorporating the illocutionary effects of a slur term as part of its
conventional meaning so that it becomes part of what is said. Jeshion 2013 develops a three-tiered expressivist semantics where the
key explanatory component is the speaker’s expression of contempt toward target groups. Jeshion 2018 argues that slurs dehumanize
targets by treating them as inferior and that the moral structure of contempt is critical in rebutting various objections made to
expressivism. Jeshion 2016 argues that expression of contempt is also critical in explaining how slur words are created and how bigotry
is formed. Green 2016 advocates an expressivist treatment of slurs as “expressive artifacts,” which combine representation and
expression.
Green, Mitchell. “Expressing, Showing and Representing.” In The Expression of Emotion: Philosophical, Psychological and
Legal Perspectives. Edited by Catharine Abell and Joel Smith, 25–45. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Argues that slurs and neutral counterparts are semantically equivalent but differ in that slurs convey a conventional, though non-truth-
conditional, expressive component. Responds to various challenges to expressivism and draws parallels between slurs and metaphors,
contrasting their expressive powers.
Jeshion, Robin. “Expressivism and the Offensiveness of Slurs.” Philosophical Perspectives 27.1 (2013): 231–259.
Defends a three-tiered expressivist semantics that encodes: (a) a group-designating component (truth-conditional); (b) an expressivist
component that captures the speaker’s expression of contempt (non-truth-conditional); (c) an identifying component that provides a
reductive classification of the target. Argues against the objection that expressivism cannot explain: (i) derogatory variation; (ii)
derogatory autonomy; and (iii) non-derogatory uses and other special uses, including non-literal uses and approbatives such as “hottie.”
Jeshion, Robin. “Slur Creation, Bigotry Formation: The Power of Expressivism.” Phenomenology and Mind 11 (2016): 130–
139.
Argues that words come to function as slurs because they are used with behavioral manifestations of contempt that crystallize into the
conventional meaning of words. Contempt also explains how slurs help promote bigotry by spawning shared identities among those
who use slurs as superior, thus enabling in-group/out-group construction.
Jeshion, Robin. “Slurs, Dehumanization, and the Expression of Contempt.” In Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on
Slurs. Edited by David Sosa, 77–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Rebuts three kinds of objections to Jeshion’s 2013 expressivist framework concerning: (a) absence of affect; (b) transpersonal
normative power of slurs; and (c) targets’ identities. Key is the moral structure of contempt such that the properties on which contempt
is grounded are fundamental to the target’s identity as a person. By reductively classifying targets as unworthy of respect, users of slurs
dehumanize them both through thoughts and actions.
Richard, Mark. When Truth Gives Out. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Argues in chapter 1 that slurs’ offense resides in performative and expressive aspects that are inherent to a contemptuous way of
thinking of targets and thus are part of what is said with a slur. This mode of thinking ties together attitude and classification so that we
cannot identify the target without endorsing the contempt proffered on the basis of their group membership. This is a misrepresentation
that renders slurs non-truth-evaluable.
Richard, Mark. “How do Slurs Mean?” In Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs. Edited by David Sosa, 164–176.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Defines the meaning of a slur as constituted by an “interpretive common ground” among speakers who share a range of attitudes about
targets. Being competent with a slur requires making all the presuppositions that constitute the term’s interpretive common ground. But
one can understand a slur without endorsing the full range of attitudes that constitute its meaning. This explains why non-slurring uses
are still offensive.
Saka, Paul. “Hate Speech.” In How to Think About Meaning. By Paul Saka, 121–153. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer,
2007.
Argues that slurs express an attitude complex involving (i) a belief that predicates the target’s group membership and (ii) a cognitive-
affective attitude of expressing disdain toward the target; (i) is truth-conditional, but not (ii), which makes the utterance neither true nor
false. Shows how this, together with socio-pragmatic factors, can explain friendly uses of slurs, appropriation, reports of slurs, variable
offense, distinction from pejoratives, pejorative verbs, and adjectives.
Hybrid Expressivism: Slurs, Moral Terms, and Evaluatives
Discussions about the evaluative nature of slurs first emerged in the meta-ethics literature. A core task is to define the meaning of moral
terms, and whether or not they are truth-apt and belief-expressing. This is often approached by means of the close relationship
between slurs and pejorative terms more generally. Key to this analogous relationship is the idea that both slurs and moral terms are
dual-content expressions in that they express a descriptive content and an expressive content. Differences arise from how the
expressive content is treated, and whether or not the analogy with slurs is apt for explaining moral terms, in particular with respect to
their embedding versus projection behavior. Barker 2000 offers an early hybrid expressivist treatment of slurs. Barker 2014 develops
the conventional implicature view in a cognitivist expressivist framework. Copp 2001 defends a realist-expressivist view of moral
language and connects this to slurs. Copp 2009 responds to criticism of the hybrid expressivist view developed in Copp 2001. Boisvert
2008 motivates the parallel between slurs and moral terms. Hay 2011 argues that pejoratives are a better model for moral terms than
slurs. Schroeder 2014 argues that slurs do not have a closely analogous relationship with moral terms. Fletcher 2014 criticizes the
parallel between slurs and moral terms. Cepollaro 2016 is concerned with the relationship between slurs and thick concepts (e.g.,
“lewd” and “brave”).
Barker, Stephen J. “Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?” Analysis 60.267 (2000): 268–279.
Argues that slurs share with moral terms a dual content: a descriptive component identifying the target’s group membership and an
expressive component of contempt toward the target. Both slurs and moral terms convey the specific moral attitude by way of
conventional implicature. Since (a) and (b) remain independent, this explains why non-racists can accept (a) but reject (b).
Barker, Stephen J. “Pure Versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature.” In Having It Both Ways:
Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. Edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, 199–222. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014.
Offers a conventional implicature theory of value-sentences on the dual-content model of slurs. Argues that making sense of
conventional implicature as a mode of unsaid content requires accepting a form of pure, non-hybrid expressivism about statements of
correctness of illocutionary acts. This is a cognitive expressivist view which explains expressive talk as truth-apt and belief-expressing.
Boisvert, D. R. “Expressive-Assertivism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89.2 (2008): 169–203.
Defends hybrid expressivism, which analyzes moral terms according to the same pattern as slurs. Slurs are understood to directly
describe targets as belonging to a certain race or ethnic group, and directly express the speaker’s contempt toward those having this
property.
Cepollaro, Bianca. “Building Evaluation Into Language.” Phenomenology and Mind 11 (2016): 158–168.
Argues that slurs and thick concepts make different predictions with regard to reference and extension. Defends the “objective” view,
according to which slurs’ evaluative content is not about the speaker’s mental state (“the speaker despises the target class”) but
expresses a negative judgment of the target (“the target class is despicable”) and argues that it is more successful in accounting for the
complicity of slurs.
Copp, David. “Realist Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism.” Social Philosophy and Policy 18.2 (2001): 1–43.
Argues that moral terms are similar to slurs/pejoratives in that their use can both ascribe a property and express a relevant “conative
attitude.” They are both “dual-use” expressive terms that have a descriptive component of ascribing a property in the same way
ordinary descriptive predicates do and an expressive component that is associated with a relevant non-cognitive attitude.
Copp, David. “Realist-Expressivism and Conventional Implicature.” Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics 4 (2009): 167–202.
Argues that moral terms are treated on the model of slurs in that both conventionally implicate that the speaker has a suitable attitude: a
moral attitude and a derogatory attitude, respectively. The view combines a standard truth-conditional semantics regarding the
contribution that slurs make to truth-conditions and an expressivist account that captures their derogatory significance.
Fletcher, Guy. “Moral Utterances, Attitude, Expression, and Implicature.” In Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern
Metaethics. Edited by Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, 173–198. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Explores the extent to which moral terms, or their deployment in utterances, convey the speaker’s attitudes partly by critically examining
the putative parallel with slur terms.
Hay, Ryan. “Hybrid Expressivism and the Analogy Between Pejoratives and Moral Language.” European Journal of
Philosophy 21.3 (2011): 450–474.
Argues that pejoratives are a better model for moral terms than slurs because their descriptive component is non-detachable and, when
embedded, the negative attitudes are attributed to the reportee. In contrast, slurs have detachable descriptive components and they
can be used by speakers to express their own negative attitudes even when reporting the beliefs of others.
Schroeder, Marc. “The Truth in Hybrid Semantics.” In Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. Edited by
Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge, 273–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Contrasts slurs and moral talk in terms of their projection behavior. Though the moral attitudes expressed with moral terms project out,
they do contribute to truth-conditional content. In contrast, the attitudes expressed with slurs project through attitude verbs but do not
affect truth-conditional content. Abandons the idea that “core” content characterizes truth conditions and that secondary content can
affect truth-conditional content.
Conventional Implicature Accounts
Another way of treating the expressive component of slurs is via an analogous relationship to expressive terms, including pejoratives,
expletives, swear words, and vulgarities. All are evaluative, rather than descriptive, in that they serve primarily to express the speaker’s
attitudes, emotions, and feelings, about something or someone. Differences arise depending on whether or not the expressive content
of slurs exhausts their linguistic meaning and whether or not they also convey a descriptive content. For example, Hedger 2012
develops the parallel between slurs and expressive terms. Hedger 2013 argues that the offensive content of slurs is exhausted by the
expressive component. Croom 2014a argues against a purely expressive treatment of slurs. Croom 2014b proposes a hybrid approach
in which slurs have both descriptive and expressive contents. Blakemore 2015 rejects the analogy between slurs and expletives and
argues that slurs also have a descriptive content. Theories also differ with respect to the mechanism for implementing the expressive
dimension of meaning. There are two types of accounts that model the derogative content of slurs, either as conventional implicature or
as presupposition. In the conventional implicature camp, Potts 2007 argues that non-slurring pejoratives are conveyed as “not-at-issue”
or backgrounded information. Harris and Potts 2009 shows that the perspective expressed can be shifted to other agents than the
speaker. McCready 2010 extends Potts 2007 to accommodate slurs as conventional implicature. Davis and McCready 2020 argues that
slurs’ power derives from their power to invoke a range of ideological background assumptions. Kirk-Giannini 2019 defends a Potts-
style semantics in which slurs work as directives to hearers to adopt negative perspectives on the target. Gutzmann 2011 treats slurs as
mixed expressives. Gutzmann 2015 provides a hybrid semantic approach of non-slurring pejoratives and other expressive terms whose
conventional meaning goes beyond truth-conditional content.
Blakemore, Diane. “Slurs and Expletives: A Case Against a General Account of Expressive Meaning.” Language Sciences 52
(2015): 22–35.
Offers a relevance-theoretic analysis on how the offensive attitude of slurs derives from the meta-linguistic knowledge that the word is
derogatory. This raises an expectation of relevance that is satisfied by drawing an indeterminate range of assumptions associated with
the cultural stereotype.
Croom, Adam M. “Remarks on “The Semantics of Racial Slurs.” Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 13 (2014a): 11–32.
Argues that Hedger 2012 and its pure expressivist account of slurs is inadequate. Suggests that an adequate account should also
incorporate also a descriptive component into the meaning of slurs.
Croom, Adam M. “The Semantics of Slurs: A Refutation of Expressivism.” Language and Sciences 41 (2014b): 227–242.
Argues against “pure expressivist” accounts of slurs (as defended by Hedger 2012), claiming that they do not capture appropriated
uses of slurs.
Davis, Christopher, and Elin McCready. Special Issue: Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs. Edited by Bianca Cepollaro and Dan
Zeman. Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (2020): 63–85.
Argues that in addition to predicating group-membership of targets, slurs invoke a complex of historical facts and social attitudes.
Explains slurs’ offense in terms of the impact of the invoked content on the hearer. Distinguishes slurs’ offense from their derogation.
Gutzmann, Daniel. “Expressive Modifiers and Mixed Expressives.” Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 8 (2011): 123–
141.
Argues, contra Potts 2007, for the existence of expressive modifiers (which take expressive- type terms as their arguments) and mixed
expressives including slur terms (which contribute both descriptive and expressive content), which are not predicted by Potts’s logic of
conventional implicature. Extends Potts’s logic with new tree-admissibility conditions so that it can account for the semantics of
sentences containing such expressions.
Gutzmann, Daniel. “The Case for Use-Conditional Meaning.” In Use-Conditional Meaning: Studies in Multidimensional
Semantics. By Daniel Gutzmann, 14–43. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Explains the meaning of slurs in terms of use conditions (i.e., the conditions under which an expression can be uttered felicitously).
Argues that use conditions can be fulfilled or not in a context and models this formally as a set of contexts.
Harris, Jesse A., and Christopher Potts. “Perspective-Shifting With Appositives and Expressives.” Linguistics and Philosophy
32 (2009): 523–552.
Argues against objections that expressives are invariably speaker orientated. Argues that non-speaker-orientated readings can occur
outside of attitudinal predicates. This motivates an account based in pragmatic perspective shifting.
Hedger, Joseph. “The Semantics of Racial Slurs.” Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 11 (2012): 74–84.
Argues that slurs and expressive terms (e.g., “damn”) share an expressive content in that they display the speaker’s attitude but lack
descriptive content. This renders slurring sentences non-truth-apt, explaining why speakers refuse to assent to the truth of a slurring
sentence, while they accept corresponding sentences containing a neutral counterpart. Discusses slurs’ projection behavior as a
challenge for truth-conditional semantics.
Hedger, Joseph A. “Meaning and Racial Slurs: Derogatory Epithets and the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface.” Language &
Communication 33.3 (2013): 205–213.
Discusses slurs’ projection behavior and their behavior in logical inference relations. Concludes that a pragmatic account such as a
conventional implicature view is inadequate to explain this behavior and that a semantic account is preferable.
Kirk-Giannini, Cameron D. “Slurs Are Directives.” Philosophers’ Imprint 19.48 (2019): 1–28.
Argues slurs are conventional devices for issuing directives (e.g., to adopt a perspective). The resulting semantics includes an at-issue
content denoting the target’s group-membership, and a not-at-issue directive content. This is claimed to help hearers cognize better
target group members. Implements this proposal formally using Pottsian machinery developed for conventional implicature items.
McCready, Elin. “Varieties of Conventional Implicature.” Semantics & Pragmatics 3.8 (2010): 1–57.
Extends Potts 2007 logic for supplementary conventional implicatures to accommodate a wide range of expressive constructions,
including slurs, in several languages. Slurs are analyzed as objects with conventionally implicated expressive meanings that provide the
main content of their utterances.
Potts, Christopher. “The Expressive Dimension.” Theoretical Linguistics 33.2 (2007): 165–197.
Argues that pejoratives and expressive terms share an expressive meaning that is separated from the descriptive content. Treats the
derogatory content of pejoratives as “not-at-issue”—that is, a conventional implicature that typically projects to become the speaker’s
commitment with the entire utterance. Identifies several properties of expressives that justify their treatment as a separate dimension of
meaning.
Presupposition Accounts
In the presuppositional camp, the derogatory content is also presented as taken-for-granted. Presuppositions are often hard to tell apart
from conventional implicatures. Macià 2002 offers the first presuppositional analysis of pejoratives. Schlenker 2007 offers a two-
dimensional dynamic semantics, which treats slurs like expressives. Cepollaro 2015 examines two types of presuppositional analysis of
slurs. Cepollaro and Stojanovic 2016 defends a unified presuppositional account of slurs and thick terms. Marques and García-
Carpintero 2020 defends an expressive presuppositional account that makes room for a normative dimension specific to affective
attitudes.
Cepollaro, Bianca. “In Defence of a Presuppositional Account of Slurs.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 36–45.
Discusses two ways to articulate the presupposed content: a subjective one (“the speaker despises the target class”) and an objective
one (“the target class is despicable”). Also, suggests that cancellability should not be taken as a matter of degree but as a clear-cut
feature of projective content.
Cepollaro, Bianca, and Isidora Stojanovic. “Hybrid Evaluatives: In Defense of a Presuppositional Account.” Grazer
Philosophische Studien 93 (2016): 458–488.
Defends a unified presuppositional account of slurs and thick terms, which are treated as “hybrid evaluatives.” Both kinds of terms
encode a descriptive (truth-evaluable) content and presuppose some evaluative content. This analysis allows us to explain the main
features of both slurs and thick terms.
Macià, Josep. “Presuposición y Significado Expresivo.” Theoria 17.45 (2002): 499–513.
Argues (contra Kaplan) that certain phenomena regarding the validity of arguments involving pejoratives (and other expressives) can be
accounted for using the notion of presupposition. Shows how to extend the presuppositional analysis to other expressions with pure
non-truth-conditional meanings such as greetings (“Hello”). Written in Spanish.
Marques, Teresa, and Manuel García-Carpintero Special Issue: Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs. Edited by Bianca Cepollaro and
Dan Zeman. Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (2020): 138–158.
Argues that slurs presuppose a derogatory normative component of the target (i.e., “one must derogate group G on account of their
having features F1 . . . Fn only if group G has F1 . . . Fn, and contempt fits a group with such features.” Such expressive
presuppositions are not just propositions on the common ground but require the conversation to be governed by norms specific to
affective attitudes and their expression. Discusses attitude reports, cancellation, and non-derogatory uses.
Schlenker, Philippe. “Expressive Presuppositions.” Theoretical Linguistics 33.2 (2007): 237–245.
Argues that slurs carry a presupposition that is (i) indexical, (ii) attitudinal, and (iii) sometimes shiftable. Thus, in using a slur the
speaker presupposes that contextually they have a negative attitude toward the target group, but sometimes this attitude can be
attributed to someone other than the speaker.
Pragmatic Accounts
These embrace the equivalence between slurs and their neutral counterparts and explain the difference between them as deriving from
what else gets done by using the slur rather than its neutral counterpart. This is often defined by reference to usage conventions
governing the use of a slur such that it is linguistically inappropriate to address someone with a slur unless one has contempt for the
target group. Differences arise depending on the nature of the derogatory content and the mechanisms for implementing it. Most
popular pragmatic accounts are conventional implicature accounts which hold that the derogatory content is conveyed as
backgrounded content in that it is presented as taken for granted. Alternative accounts posit other types of pragmatic inferences,
including routinized conversational implicatures. Nunberg 2018 argues that slurs offend because they are words that bigots use, so they
derive their power from the speaker’s association with the attitudes of a group who owns the word. Bolinger 2017 contends that slurs
are comparable to impolite behavior and that by choosing to use a slur the speaker signals that she is endorsing the negative attitudes
associated with the slur. Rappaport 2019 defends a relevance-theoretic account of slurs in terms of “showing” that the speaker has
negative attitudes toward the target. Croom 2008 sketches a pragmatic view of slurs that explores their relationship to metaphor.
Corazza 2004 argues that epithets express multiple propositions, among which the derogatory content is expressed as a pragmatic
presupposition.
Blakemore, Diane. “Slurs and Expletives: A Case Against a General Account of Expressive Meaning.” Language Sciences 52
(2015): 22–35.
Offers a relevance-theoretic account in terms of conversational implicature. Argues that when the speaker choses to use a slur instead
of its neutral counterpart, they convey their derogatory attitudes toward the target.
Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen. “The Pragmatics of Slurs.” Noûs 51.3 (2017): 439–463.
Argues that slurs’ offense derives from the speaker’s contrastive preference for using a slur over its neutral counterpart. By choosing a
slur the speaker signals that she is endorsing the associated negative attitudes. The signal can convey offensive content, regardless of
the speaker’s intentions, and hearer’s uptake. However, the signal is defeasible if the speaker is ignorant about the associated attitudes
or is unaware of a neutral alternative to the slur.
Corazza, Eros. “On Epithets qua Attributive Anaphors.” Journal of Linguistics 41 (2004): 1–32.
Defends a multiple-proposition theory according to which epithets express an “official proposition,” which affects truth-conditional
content and a background proposition in the form of a pragmatic presupposition. Discusses anaphoric constructions in which the epithet
functions like an attributive anaphor in that it inherits its value from the subject and attributes a typically negative property to them.
Croom, Adam. “Racial Epithets: What We Say and Mean by Them.” Dialogue 51 (2008): 34–45.
Draws on Camp’s work on metaphor and argues that slurs involve inaccurate “characterization” of the target. Contrasts this view with
Hom 2008 (cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts) and its semantic view of slurs.
Horn, Laurence. “Nice Words for Nasty Things: Taboo and its Discontents.” In Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on
Slurs. Edited by David Sosa, 202–239. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Like Nunberg 2018, Horn argues that slurs’ offense lies in the metadata. Discussed in more detail under Non-Content Theories.
Nunberg, Geoffrey. “The Social Life of Slurs.” In New Work on Speech Acts. Edited by Daniel Fogal, Daniel Harris, and Matt
Moss, 248–306. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues that slurs are not special: they offend because they are words bigots use. The offense does not reside in linguistic meaning but
in metadata (i.e., encyclopedic knowledge about who uses the term). The conventional meaning of a slur is linked to the social practice
of using it to signal the speaker’s affiliation with a bigoted group. This gives rise to a “ventriloquistic implicature” that exploits the maxim
of manner.
Rappaport, Jesse. “Communicating with Slurs.” The Philosophical Quarterly 69.277 (2019): 795–816.
Explains three features of slurs: descriptive, evaluative, and affective. The descriptive feature is part of a thin semantics where slurs
and neutral counterparts denote target group membership. The evaluative feature is accounted for in terms of a relevance-theoretic
notion of showing. Speakers implicate their negative attitudes toward the target group by ostensibly producing natural indicators that
they belong to a group of speakers who share that negative attitude. The affective feature is accounted for through similar psychological
processing present in curse words.
Slurs as Conventional Implicature
The conventional implicature view is a dual-content theory that models slurs as contributing two kinds of content: (a) a descriptive
content that identifies the salient referent as belonging to a target group, and (b) an expressive content that captures the speaker’s
expression of a contemptuous, derogatory attitude toward targets. Content (a) is asserted, thus truth-conditional; (b) is conventionally
implicated, thus non-truth-conditional. There are various mechanisms for implementing the conventional implicature depending on the
general commitments of the theoretical framework within which the account is developed. What is common to all is that the expressive
component has the status of being taken for granted, and so it is not something that can be easily challenged, questioned, and denied.
Sennet and Copp 2017 is concerned with how slurring occurs in the privacy of a bigot’s thoughts. Lycan 2015 argues that slurs and
neutral counterparts are truth-conditionally equivalent but differ in that slurs lexically presume a derogatory belief or attitude about the
target group. Whiting 2013 argues that slurring is done not by what is said but by the way it is said. Williamson 2009 argues against an
inferentialist treatment of slurs and in favor of a referentialist semantics. Whiting 2008 provides an inferentialist treatment of slurs
combined with Gricean pragmatics. Vallée 2014 develops a multi-propositionalist theory that explains the difference between slurs and
neutral counterparts in terms of cognitive significance.
Lycan, William. “Slurs and Lexical Presumption.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 3–11.
Argues that slurs lexically presume a contemptuous attitude about the target group. Lexical presumptions are carried by the choice of
words, so choosing a slur over its neutral counterpart is inappropriate unless certain factual and normative assumptions are made.
These presumptions are lexicalized into the conventional meaning of the slur, over and above truth-conditional content, so they are not
compositional and non-truth-conditional, though sometimes they are cancellable.
Sennet, Adam, and David Copp. “Pejoratives and Ways of Thinking.” Analytic Philosophy 58.3 (2017): 248–271.
Defends an “implicated way of thinking” view to explain: (i) how pejorative “concepts” function in thought and (ii) how derogatory
language relates to bigoted thought. Argues that bigots and non-bigots represent the targets in different ways. Bigots misrepresent
them as deserving contempt, and when using a slur, they conventionally implicate that they think of the target in contemptuous ways.
The difference is in what is implicated, not in sense or reference.
Vallée, Richard. “Slurring and Common Knowledge of Ordinary Language.” Journal of Pragmatics 61 (2014): 78–90.
Argues that slurs and neutral counterparts share the same “official content” in that they say the same thing and thus share the same
truth value, but they differ in that slurs conventionally implicate contempt for the target group. Discusses embedding of slurs under
negation and propositional attitudes.
Whiting, Daniel. “Conservatives and Racists: Inferential Role Semantics and Pejoratives.” Philosophia 36 (2008): 375–388.
Responds to Williamson 2009 and its challenge that inferential role semantics cannot account for slurs by proposing an inferentialism
supplemented with Gricean pragmatics. Inferentialism explains slurs’ semantics, which is limited to inferences that speakers are
disposed to draw from uses of slurs, and these are the same inferences they are disposed to draw from their neutral counterparts.
Thus, slurs and their neutral counterparts do not differ semantically but rather in pragmatic associations.
Whiting, Daniel. “It’s Not What You Said, It’s the Way You Said It: Slurs and Conventional Implicatures.” Analytic Philosophy
54.3 (2013): 364–377.
Explains the difference between slur and neutral counterparts in terms of the attitude that is conventionally implicated by using a slur.
Defends this view against objections that apply both to cognitivist and non-cognitivist versions of it and raises objections for
combinatorial externalism and prohibitionism.
Williamson, Timothy. “Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives.” In The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Edited by
Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi, 137–158. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Argues that inferentialism is inadequate, since being disposed to reason according to a slur’s inferential role is not necessary to
understand a slur or have a pejorative concept. Defends a referentialist semantics on which slurs and neutral counterparts have the
same reference but differ in that slurs conventionally implicate a derogatory content about the target group. Considers the role of
pejoration in thought and the relative priority of language and thought.
The Social Nature of Slurs
In contrast to content-based theories locating the offense of slurs in their meaning, we can locate slurs in another camp that focuses on
their social nature in how they bring about harm and offense. Non-content theories define slurs’ offense by reference to social
prohibitions on uses of slurs and socio-linguistic facts regarding which groups tend to use slurs. Anderson and Lepore 2013a and
Anderson and Lepore 2013b argue that prohibitionism is not a linguistic but a social matter related to social practices. Social and
historical factors are also at the forefront of speech act theories that focus not on what slur terms mean but on what they are used to do.
This involves uncovering the mechanisms by which slurs affect social relationships between interlocutors both at the level of the
conversation and beyond it. Social factors are also critical in creating the conditions for reclamation projects and other non-derogatory
uses of slurs. Social structures and social norms are also critical to the mechanics of gendered slurs and sexist speech.
Non-Content Theories
Prohibitionism is the most notable non-content theory, arguing that slurs offend because they are taboo words. Anderson and Lepore
develop their theory in Anderson and Lepore 2013a and Anderson and Lepore 2013b. These highlight strengths of a prohibitionist
account and weaknesses of rival accounts. Anderson 2016 uses prohibitionism to explain the persistence of slurs’ offense in indirect
reports. Allan 2016 argues that reporting a slur need not be taken as slurring. A related approach is proposed by Lepore and Stone
2018, which stresses the role of imaginative projects infected by listeners’ salient experiences and derogatory associations. Pullum
2018 provides a lexicographical analysis explaining slurs’ offense by virtue of their associations. Horn 2018 is concerned with the
relation between slurs and taboo words.
Allan, Keith. “The Reporting of Slurs.” In Indirect Reports and Pragmatics. Edited by Alessandro Capone, Ferenc Kiefer, and
Franco Lo Piparo, 211–232. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016.
Examines whether or not a report of a slurring use counts as a slur in itself. Concludes that it does not. Evaluates the role of intentions
in determining whether the offense is warranted.
Anderson, Luvell, and Ernie Lepore. “Slurring Words.” Noûs 47.1 (2013a): 25–48.
Argues that slurs are offensive not because of what they mean but because they are “taboo” words. Using a slur breaks social norms
and conventions, so it is the violation of relevant edicts surrounding their prohibition that causes offense. Prohibitions are placed on
slurs by the target group or others who represent the group. Discusses objections to extant accounts.
Anderson, Luvell, and Ernie Lepore. “What Did You Call Me? Slurs As Prohibited Words.” Analytic Philosophy 54.3 (2013b):
350–363.
Defends prohibitionism against objections and raises further objections to extant theories (expressivism, inferentialism, externalist
semantics), in addition to the ones discussed in Anderson and Lepore 2013a. Among the virtues of prohibitionism, the authors mention
the ability to explain offense variation, appropriation, and restrictions on appropriation.
Anderson, Luvell. “When Reporting Others Backfires.” In Indirect Reports and Pragmatics. Edited by Alessandro Capone,
Ferenc Kiefer, and Franco Lo Piparo, 253–264. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016.
Argues that reports containing slurs offend because of a general prohibition on tokening a slur word. So, the offense is attributed to the
reporter, since they violate the prohibition. Argues that the prohibitive norms placed on slurs block semantic and pragmatic mechanisms
from doing their work in reports.
Horn, Laurence. “Nice Words for Nasty Things: Taboo and Its Discontents.” In Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on
Slurs. Edited by David Sosa, 202–239. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Examines the linguistic landscape of taboo avoidance and its role in meaning change. In the case of taboo words, Horn’s principle
“Avoid Homonymy” blocks a word’s sense or uses even when no confusion would occur.
Lepore, Ernie, and Matthew Stone. “Pejorative Tone.” In Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs. Edited by David
Sosa, 141–163. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues that slurs and neutral counterparts differ in “tone,” where tone is defined as a demeaning perspective (i.e., an intuitive way of
thinking delineated by negative stereotypes about targets). This is a psychological construct prompted by listeners’ salient experiences
and social and historical associations that infects their judgment and shapes their responses in a way that complements or transcends
the speaker’s intentions. Explains reclamation as a difference in tone.
Pullum, Geoffrey. “Slurs and Obscenities: Lexicography, Semantics, and Philosophy.” In Bad Words: Philosophical
Perspectives on Slurs. Edited by David Sosa, 177–201. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues against content-based accounts that incorporate the disparaging content of slurs into their lexical meaning (e.g., Hom 2008,
cited under Truth-Conditional Semantic Accounts), and also against expressivist accounts relying on the analogy between slurs and
swear words and expletives. Focuses instead on metadata facts about the slur words, which are not part of its meaning.
Rappaport, Jesse. Special Issue: Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs. Edited by Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Zeman. Grazer
Philosophische Studien 97 (2020): 177–202.
Argues that expressivist and prohibitionist accounts cannot adequately explain slurs’ toxicity. To explain their emotional and
psychological harm, such accounts need to be complemented with a neuro-psycho-social model similar to that proposed for curse
words.
Speech-Act Theories
Speech-act accounts focus not on what slur terms mean but on what we use them to do. This involves taking on board contextual and
conversational phenomena in order to determine the kinds of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts that speakers perform in using slurs.
This is important when we consider the variability in slurs’ pattern for projection and embedding in complex utterances such as
conditionals, negations, reports, and modals, among others. Camp 2018 examines how the broader discourse structure in which slurs
are embedded affects the variability in prominence of the derogatory acts performed with slurs. Thinking of slurs as actions we perform
is also important in making sense of the idea that slurs are tools of oppression and subordination. Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt 2018 argues
that slurs are a way of grabbing power in conversation, and this changes the power dynamics among interlocutors, depriving targets of
their conversational rights and lowering their discourse status. A fundamental question at the forefront of work on oppressive speech is
whether or not we can make a case that hate speech and oppressive speech more generally do not only cause harm by changing
listeners’ beliefs and attitudes but are constitutive of harm. McGowan 2009 discusses two models of oppressive speech as constituting
harm. McGowan 2012 shows how harm occurs in informal racist hate speech and discusses consequences for regulating it. McGowan
2018 discusses applications to micro-aggressions, stereotype threat, offhand sexist remarks, and general implications for free speech
principles. Langton 2012 provides a pragmatic model of hate speech and pornography that makes room for illocutionary and
perlocutionary acts of advocating hatred and inciting desire. Kukla 2014 is concerned with how social context and discursive
conventions can subvert the uptake that is given to certain speech acts based on the social relationship between speaker and target.
Simpson 2013 elaborates on McGowan 2009 and its claim that speech can yield identity-based oppression by altering the permissibility
facts both in conversation and beyond. Bianchi 2019 argues that the social role of both speaker and hearer are key in understanding
under what conditions acts of slurring subordinate and under what conditions listeners can object. Bianchi 2014 shows how a speech-
act account accommodates properties of derogatory epithets in terms of illocutionary acts and perlocutionary effects. Bianchi 2018
reframes Lepore and Stone 2018 as a perspectival account of slurs in terms of a speech-act account, focusing on their use in
performing acts of assault and propaganda. Bianchi 2019 raises objections to Langton 2012, an account of hate speech and
pornography. Penco 2018 draws attention to a specific act of “calling for joint responsibility” to the extent that speakers influence their
interlocutors to share the derogatory commitment that slurs carry. Tenchini and Frigerio 2016 defends a multi-speech-act view of slurs.
Meibauer 2016 argues that insulting is the primary illocutionary act performed with slurs.
Bianchi, Claudia. “The Speech Acts Account of Derogatory Epithets: Some Critical Notes.” In Liber Amirocum Pascal Engel
Edited by Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio, and Anne Meylan, 465–480. Geneva, Switzerland: University of Geneva, 2014.
Discusses three types of illocutionary acts: (a) assault-like speech such as persecuting and degrading acts; (b) propaganda-like speech
of inciting and promoting racial discrimination, hate, and violence; and (c) authoritative subordinating acts of enacting and legitimating
systems of racial oppression.
Bianchi, Claudia. “Perspectives and Slurs.” In Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics. Edited by Gerhard Preyer, 187–198. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues that slurs are harmful because they are used to perform acts of assault and propaganda. Explains several properties:
derogatory autonomy, complicity of addressees and bystanders, appropriation, generality of derogatory speech, and the harm inflicted
both on targets and bystanders of slurs. Discusses the causal versus constitutive distinction of harm.
Bianchi, Claudia. “Asymmetrical Conversations: Acts of Subordination and the Authority Problem.” Grazer Philosophische
Studien 29 (2019): 401–418.
Argues that a solution to the authority problem for speech act accounts of slurs must include not only the social role of the speaker but
also that of the hearer. Hearers must be in a dominant social position in order to either license or object to the speaker’s authority.
Target group members, having a low status, cannot easily object.
Camp, Elisabeth. “A Dual-Act Speech Act Theory.” In Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs. Edited by David Sosa,
38–68. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues that slurs are used to perform two distinct but coordinated speech acts: (i) predicating group membership and (ii) expressing a
commitment to the appropriateness of a derogating perspective on the group. Argues that the variability in intuitions about truth and in
projection depends on factors such as the conversational focus, the speaker’s purposes, and discourse structure, which determine the
variability in prominence of the two acts across different contexts.
Kukla, Rebecca. “Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice.” Hypatia 29.2 (2014): 440–457.
Discusses the normative statuses that speech acts institute and introduces the concept of “discursive injustice.” Treats gender-based
oppressive speech acts as “performatives.” Argues that for performatives to have force, they must have “uptake.” Argues that how an
audience uptakes a speech act determines what speech act it turns out to be (i.e., what normative statuses it actually succeeds in
instituting).
Langton, Rae. “Beyond Belief: Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography.” In Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free
Speech. Edited by Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan, 94–120. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Argues that pornography and hate speech perform illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of inciting desire and advocating hatred. This
changes hearers’ beliefs but also their attitudes, feelings, desires, altering norms of behaviors. Explains how these changes come
about via a normative and psychological accommodation of attitudes such as desire and hatred. This captures constitutive and causal
harm of hate speech and pornography.
McGowan, Mary Kate. “Oppressive Speech.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87.3 (2009): 389–407.
Argues that central to a model of oppressive speech is the notion of “exercitive,” which enacts permissibility facts, thereby changing
what is permissible to do later on. Distinguishes two kinds of exercitive acts: (a) standard Austinian exercitives, which require the
speaker’s authority, and (b) covert exercitives by which speakers need not intend to alter permissibility facts nor need the authority to
enact norms.
McGowan, Mary Kate. “On ‘Whites Only’ Signs and Racist Hate Speech: Verbal Acts of Racial Discrimination.” In Speech and
Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech. Edited by Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan, 222–250. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012.
Argues that racist hate speech is like “Whites Only” signs in that both constitute illegal acts that enact discriminatory norms. This
happens through the mechanism of a covert exercitive that alters conversational norms in sneaky ways, which in turn alter broader
social norms in equally sneaky ways. It is the enacting of broader social norms that makes hate speech especially harmful.
McGowan, Mary Kate. “On Covert Exercitives: Speech and the Social World.” In New Work on Speech Acts. Edited by Daniel
Fogal, Daniel W. Harris, and Matt Moss, 196–212. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues that oppressive speech constitutes harm by enacting norms that prescribe harm. An utterance can simultaneously be a move in
two norm-governed activities: (i) a conversational exercitive that enacts permissibility facts for the conversation and (ii) a covert
exercitive in the social interaction that alters permissibility facts for that interaction.
Meibauer, Jörg. “Slurring as Insulting.” In Pejoration. Edited by Rita Finkbeiner, Jörg Meibauer, and Heike Wiese, 145–165.
Linguistics Today Series 228. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2016.
Argues that slurs are devices for indicating an illocutionary force of insulting the target. Slurring is a subtype of insulting, and insulting is
a subtype of expressive speech acts. Argues contra Tenchini and Frigerio 2016 that the insulting act is a dominant illocutionary act.
Penco, Carlo. “Refusing to Endorse: A Must Explanation for Pejoratives.” In Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History.
Edited by Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi, and Sebastiano Moruzzi, 219–240. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
Argues that using a slur or pejorative amounts to performing two speech acts: (a) describing the target in an improper way; and (b) an
act of “calling for joint responsibility.” The speaker is asking their interlocutors to share a commitment to the presupposed content, and
this explains why refusing to endorse a slur is necessary to reject its implicit commitment.
Popa-Wyatt, Mihaela, and Jeremy L. Wyatt. “Slurs, Roles and Power.” Philosophical Studies 175 (2018): 2879–2906.
Argues that offense variation can be explained by the notion of a speech act that assigns an unjust power imbalance in the
conversational game. The offense is proportional to the perceived unjustness of the power imbalance. Introduces the notion of social
and dialogue roles and makes links to conversational games and their use in oppressive speech. Argues that semantic and
prohibitionist accounts cannot explain the data. Explains silencing and reclamation.
Simpson, Robert M. “Un-Ringing the Bell: McGowan on Oppressive Speech and The Asymmetric Pliability of Conversations.”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91.3 (2013): 555–575.
Discusses the “asymmetric pliability” argument to the effect that it is easier to introduce sexist presuppositions and expectations into a
conversation than it is to remove them. Generalizes this asymmetry to one between making things salient and un-salient in speech.
Tenchini, Maria Paola, and Aldo Frigerio. “A Multi-Act Perspective on Slurs.” In Pejoration. Edited by Rita Finkbeiner, Jörg
Meibauer, and Heike Wiese, 167–185. Linguistics Today Series 228. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2016.
Defends a multi-speech-act account of slurs according to which the speaker uttering a slur makes two different speech acts: one
predicating group membership of the target and the other an expressive act.
Reclamation
Reclamation is the process by which some slur terms lose their potential for offense and can begin to acquire a new, non-derogatory
meaning and start to be used with a new convention of use that serves a different purpose for the in-group community (e.g., to express
solidarity and camaraderie). This is an important social and political tool of re-empowering the targets and attenuating the stigma
associated with uses of slurs. The success of reclamation projects is limited, however. It typically remains local within the in-group
community, and even there it may be subject to slurring uses by in-group members. The focus has been in identifying the various
mechanisms that enable reclamation and the various obstacles that may hinder the process. Jeshion 2020 distinguishes between “pride
reclamation” and “insular reclamation.” Popa-Wyatt 2020 argues that reclaimed acts assign in-group members a powerful role and
create feelings of empowerment. Burnett 2020 explains reclaimed slurs in terms of a “persona”-based semantics. Hess 2020 explains
non-derogatory uses of slurs in terms of the social practices in which they are embedded. Brontsema 2004 contrasts three types of
reclamation projects depending on whether or not the stigma associated with slurs can be separated from the slur word. Anderson 2018
explains various illocutionary acts involving the N-word within the African American speech community to the extent they are related to
several communities of practice. Bianchi 2014 explains in-group uses on the same pattern as ironic self-deprecation. Herbert 2015
discusses the structural obstacles that might hinder reclamation projects. Ritchie 2015 explains the appropriation of slurs on a parallel
pattern with plural indexicals. DiFranco 2017 examines the moral implications of reclaiming slurs. Onos 2015 argues that non-
derogatory uses of slurs help target members socialize and establish a sense of identity. Gaucher, et al. 2015 is concerned with the
question of positive social change surrounding the SlutWalk movement.
Anderson, Luvell. “Calling, Addressing, and Appropriation.” In Bad Words: Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs. Edited by
David Sosa, 15–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues that non-derogatory uses of the N-word involve an illocutionary act of “addressing,” whereby the target is presented as worthy of
praise or recognition. These uses are tied to the speaker’s insider status and are restricted to members of the relevant “community of
practice.” “Addressing” contrasts with a negative illocutionary act of “calling” whereby the target is presented as contemptible; this is
analogous to “name calling.”
Bianchi, Claudia. “Slurs and Appropriation: An Echoic Account.” Journal of Pragmatics 66.5 (2014): 1–62.
Argues that appropriated uses of slurs echo derogatory uses in ways that suggest the speaker’s dissociation from the offensive content.
This takes the sting from the characteristic contempt of out-group uses.
Brontsema, Robin. “A Queer Revolution: Reconceptualizing the Debate Over Linguistic Reclamation.” Colorado Research in
Linguistics 17.1 (2004): 1–17.
Distinguishes three reclamation projects: (i) the appropriated term is inseparable from pejoration, so reclamation is opposed because
the linguistic ownership is seen as belonging to the out-group; (ii) the appropriated term is separable from pejoration, so reclamation is
supported because it neutralizes the value of the term; (iii) the appropriated term is inseparable from pejoration, but reclamation is
supported because the term exploits its stigma for confrontational purposes.
Burnett, Heather. Special Issue on Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs. Edited by Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Zeman. Grazer
Philosophische Studien 97 (2020): 31–62.
Defends a semantic account of slurs based on the notion of “personae.” For example, “dyke” is associated with a negative anti-
mainstream persona and “lesbian” with a favorable mainstream persona. Argues that semantic puzzles can be resolved by combining a
theory of personae and a theory of how listeners’ beliefs about their interlocutors’ ideologies affect utterance interpretation.
DiFranco, Ralph. “Appropriate Slurs.” Acta Analytica 32 (2017): 371–384.
Argues that reclamation is a useful moral tool, helping targets to maintain their self-respect and non-targets to show solidarity with
targets, thus helping the construction of group identity and autonomy.
Gaucher, Danielle, Brianna Hunt, and Lisa Sinclair. “Can Pejorative Terms Ever Lead to Positive Social Consequences? The
Case of SlutWalk.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 121–130.
Rejects the notion that the term “slut” is inherently derogatory and can never be empowering. Argues that it can be successfully re-
appropriated and can lead to positive change in the context of social justice movements.
Herbert, Cassie. “Precarious Projects: The Performative Structure of Appropriation.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 131–138.
Argues that reclamation seeks to subvert oppressive social norms against target groups and to bring into being new discursive
conventions governing the uptake of speech acts deploying slurs. When it succeeds, the speech act deploying a slur ceases to be
perceived as oppressive. But sometimes the subversive force is not recognized or is distorted, so it serves instead to reentrench the
norms it sought to subvert.
Hess, Leopold. Special Issue on Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs. Edited by Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Zeman. Grazer
Philosophische Studien 97 (2020): 86–105.
Explains non-derogatory slur uses in terms of the social practices in which they are embedded. Whereas derogatory uses are indexed
to a practice of discrimination, non-derogatory uses are indexed to a subversive, non-derogatory practice of satire. Argues that most
non-derogatory uses are available only to in-group speakers, though the social identity of speakers is not a decisive factor since in-
group uses may still be derogatory.
Jeshion, Robin. Special Issue on Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs. Edited by Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Zeman. Grazer
Philosophische Studien 97 (2020): 106–137.
Argues that reclamation is a process of linguistic creativity that after imitation and diffusion results in a new linguistic convention.
Distinguishes between “pride reclamation” (“queer”) and “insular reclamation” (N-word). Both have a similar structure including: “polarity
reversal,” “weapons control,” and “identity ownership.” They differ in the intended visibility. Pride reclamation seeks to redefine the
group identity as one deserving of equal respect. In insular reclamation targets seek to establish camaraderie rather than to transform
the out-group attitudes and norms.
Onos, Imoagene. “Broken Bridges: An Exchange of Slurs Between African Americans and Second Generation Nigerians and
the Impact on Identity Formation Among the Second Generation.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 176–186.
Examines uses of slurs between ethnic groups within the black racial category in the United States, arguing that slurs play a role in
identity formation for the second generation. Non-derogatory uses of slurs are a tool for socialization among young in-group members.
Popa-Wyatt, Mihaela. Special Issue on Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs. Edited by Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Zeman. Grazer
Philosophische Studien 97 (2020): 159–176.
Gives a speech-act account of reclamation. Dominant groups deploy slurs as linguistic weapons to achieve power over a target group.
The weapon is a speech act that assigns a low power role to the target. By self-labeling, target group members create a new speech
act only accessible to them. This assigns in-group members a powerful role and creates feelings of empowerment. It also makes it hard
for out-group members to use the slurring speech act.
Ritchie, Katherine. “Social Identity, Indexicality, and the Appropriation of Slurs.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17.50 (2015):
155–180.
Argues that the semantics of pronouns such as “we” can help explain why appropriation of slurs is restricted to in-group members and
why it cannot straightforwardly extend to out-group members.
Other Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs
Although slurs are used to attack they can also acquire context specific positive uses. How can this be the case? Some accounts seek
to explain both the derogatory and non-derogatory uses of slurs within a unified theory. Croom 2011, Croom 2015, and Croom 2018
offer empirical analyses of slurs for Italian Americans and Asian Americans respectively. Allan 2015 examines various uses of the N-
word in Pulp Fiction: some of these uses are derogatory while others are non-derogatory. Cepollaro 2017a explains reclaimed and in-
group uses in terms of polysemy. Cepollaro 2017b extends the echoic account of Bianchi 2014 (cited under Social Nature of Slurs:
Speech-Act Theories) to explain the variability of thick terms. Belleri 2015 examines non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses of slurs.
Beaton and Washington 2015 is concerned with the derogatory and non-derogatory uses of the Brazilian Portuguese term “slum-
dweller.” Bolinger 2020 is concerned with contested slurs.
Allan, Keith. “When is a Slur Not a Slur? The Use of Nigger in ‘Pulp Fiction’.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 187–199.
Argues that most occurrences of the N-word in Pulp Fiction are uttered by an African American to or about another African American to
express solidarity. The same holds when a white friend addresses an African American. When it is used by a white person to another it
shows disrespect. Concludes that the destructive power of slurs is determined in context and not by the lexical form.
Beaton, Mary Elizabeth, and Hannah B. Washington. “Slurs and the Indexical Field: The Pejoration and Reclaiming of
Favelado ‘Slum-Dweller’.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 12–21.
Defends a lexical indexicality model that explains both the derogatory meaning of the Brazilian Portuguese term favelado (“slum-
dweller”), and its reclaimed meaning, which is contextually limited and requires simultaneous access to the pejorative meaning. This is
explained in terms of a movement within the indexical field between pejorative and ameliorated meanings.
Belleri, Delia. “Externalistic Derogation.” Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 14 (2015): 70–81.
Argues that whether or not a slur has a derogatory effect is not a matter of the speaker’s intentions, beliefs, or feelings.
Bolinger, Renée J. Special Issue on Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs. Edited by Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Zeman. Grazer
Philosophische Studien 97 (2020): 11–30.
Explains “contested slurs,” which are terms that some speakers of a language consider derogatory but are stubbornly viewed as non-
derogatory by a non-trivial group of speakers. This requires acknowledging that linguistic communities contain significant sublinguistic
variation. If derogation is semantic, then contested slurs must be treated as a speaking past: the stubborn are right that as they use it,
the term is non-derogatory. Non-semantic views that locate derogation in the uptake effects of slurs avoid this conclusion, which is a
good reason to prefer them.
Cepollaro, Bianca. “Let’s Not Worry About the Reclamation Worry.” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17.50 (2017a): 181–193.
Explains reclamation in terms of authoritativeness rather than in-groupness: this explains how out-groups can, under special
circumstances, use slurs non-derogatorily. Contrasts reclaimed and non-reclaimed slurs with cases of polysemic formal and non-formal
personal pronouns in Romance languages.
Cepollaro, Bianca. “When Evaluation Changes: An Echoic Account of Appropriation and Variability.” Journal of Pragmatics
117 (2017b): 29–40.
Argues that echoic theory of appropriation in Bianchi 2014 (cited under Social Nature of Slurs: Speech-Act Theories) can account for
the variability of thick terms (i.e., the phenomenon in which speakers can use a negative thick term in a positive way and vice versa).
Croom, Adam. “Slurs.” Language Sciences 33.3 (2011): 343–358.
Argues that slurs are both descriptive and expressive and that we need a family resemblance conception of category membership to
understand their use in discourse. Contrasts derogatory and appropriated uses of slurs.
Croom, Adam M. “Slurs and Stereotypes for Italian Americans: A Context-Sensitive Account of Derogation and
Appropriation.” Journal of Pragmatics 81 (2015): 36–51.
Provides a systematic and empirical analysis of slurs for Italian Americans. Employs a family resemblance account of slurs to explain
both their derogatory and appropriative uses.
Croom, Adam M. “Asian Slurs and Stereotypes in the USA: A Context-Sensitive Account of Derogation and Appropriation.”
Pragmatics and Society 9.4 (2018): 495–517.
Provides the first systematic and empirically informed analysis of slurs for Asian Americans that accounts for both their derogatory and
appropriated uses.
Gendered Slurs and Sexist Speech
Slurs are present in sexist speech. Ashwell 2016 is concerned with the nature of gendered slurs and whether or not they have a
descriptive content that ensures the equivalence with neutral counterparts. McConnell-Ginet 2012 argues that slurs are understood as
constitutive of unfair gender and sexual practices. Manne 2017 is concerned with the problem of misogyny and the noxious effects of
sexist and misogynistic speech. Fasoli, et al. 2015 examines the social acceptability of sexist slurs (“bitch”) and sexist objectifying slurs
(“hot chick”) across different types of relationships (work versus affective relationships), and as a function of the speaker’s gender (man
versus woman). Diaz-Legaspe 2018 focuses on the normalizing role of gendered slurs.
Ashwell, Lauren. “Gendered Slurs.” Journal of Social Theory and Practice 42.2 (2016): 228–239.
Argues that words such as “slut”, “bitch,” and “sissy” are more similar to slurs than insults in that they lack a descriptive correlate that
has the same extension as the slur itself and that normative factors determine the extension of “slut” or “bitch.” This poses a problem for
accounts that require a descriptive, “neutral” counterpart. Also suggests that racial and ethnic slurs might have this feature.
Diaz-Legaspe, Justina. “Normalizing Slurs and Out‐Group Slurs: The Case of Referential Restriction.” Analytic Philosophy
59.2 (2018): 234–255.
Argues that gendered slurs work by pointing to a particular behavior or disposition to behave in a certain way that deviates from what is
socially expected from members of the neutral class.
Fasoli, Fabio, Andrea Carnaghi, and Maria Paola Paladino. “Social Acceptability of Sexist Derogatory and Sexist Objectifying
Slurs Across Contexts.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 98–107.
Argues that sexist slurs in Italian are judged more offensive and less socially acceptable than sexist objectifying slurs, both in work and
affective relationships. Sexist objectifying slurs were less acceptable when used by men than by women.
Manne, Kate. Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Defines misogyny as a property of practices, institutions, artworks, and cultural environment, rather than a psychological property.
Examines the various moves and forms that misogyny can take, showing how it is instrumental in upholding patriarchal norms and
perpetuating harmful practices. Explains misogyny as the patriarchy’s “law-enforcement” and sexism as its “ideological” branch.
Considers the role of sexist and misogynistic speech and behavior against women in power.
McConnell-Ginet, Sally. “Language, Gender, and Sexuality.” In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. Edited
by Gillian Russell and Delia Graff Fara, 741–752. New York: Routledge, 2012.
Argues that gendered slurs exhibit an asymmetry in insult potential depending on whether: a) they target women or men, b) are second-
versus third-person uses, or c) represent the diachronic shift of derogation over time. Also explains how slurs target sexual minorities
and have the effect of policing gender and sexual conformity, thus “naturalizing” the harm against them.
A Taxonomy of Derogatives
Slurs are derogative devices whose primary function is to offend and insult. But many pejoratives offend and insult. What makes slurs
different? A series of papers is focused on a variety of linguistic properties of slurs and related phenomena such as pejoratives,
stereotypes, generics, put-downs, and insults more generally. The focus has been on the linguistic mechanisms for implementing the
derogatory content of slurs compared to the other phenomena. Other work has been focused on the social and psychological nature of
insults and offense (e.g., Neu 2008 (cited under Insults, Taboos, Racist Humor, Non-Verbal Derogation).
Slurs Versus Pejoratives, Put-Downs, Stereotypes, Generics, Racist Images, and Memes
Carrus 2016 examines the interaction between assertions containing slurs and corresponding denials. Cella 2016 analyzes the
semantic content of slurs in terms of an expressive component and a generic component. Croom 2015 is concerned with racial slurs
and stereotypes in the workplace. Archer 2015 draws a parallel between slurs and verbally aggressive acts such as put-downs, insults,
and backhanded compliments. Croom 2013 discusses empirical data of three kinds of slur uses. Yoon 2015 shows the systematicity of
slurs co-occurring with expressive terms in Korean. Embrick and Henricks 2015 is concerned with the social implications of using racial
slurs and stereotypes. Jackson 2015 examines how structural oppression helps naturalize a rhetoric of violence through the use of
slurs, racist talk, racist images, and memes. Čupković 2015 examines Croatian slurs targeting the identities of ethnic and other social
groups. Weissbrod 2015 discusses the effects of anti-Semitic slurs as used by celebrities and public figures from the point of view of
translation studies.
Archer, Dawn. “Slurs, Insults, (Backhanded) Compliments and Other Strategic Facework Moves.” Language Sciences 52
(2015): 82–97.
Introduces the notion of “facework scale” to explain the variety of uses of slur words. This refers to face-enhancing and face-threatening
strategies. These explain various uses of the N-word, including slurring uses, in-group uses, and unsuccessful cases of
(re-)appropriation. Explains how facework moves can ensure plausible deniability by manipulating others’ views about targets without
appearing to be impolite.
Carrus, Simone. “Slurs: At-Issueness and Semantic Normativity.” Phenomenology and Mind 11 (2016): 85–97.
Discusses the usefulness of the notion of “at-issueness” for a debate on the lexical semantics of slurs. Concludes that even if a family
resemblance conception of category membership could account for non-standard uses of the Italian slur “froccio,” it cannot account for
the related semantic normativity problem.
Cella, Federico. “Slurs: Semantic Content, Expressive Content and Social Generics.” Phenomenology and Mind 11 (2016):
141–148.
Distinguishes two offensive dimensions of slurs: (i) a negative expressive component about the target group, which is encoded in the
semantic content, and (ii) a social generic component about that group, which is conversationally implicated.
Croom, Adam. “How To Do Things with Slurs: Studies in the Way of Derogatory Words.” Language & Communication 33.3
(2013): 177–204.
Distinguishes between the (a) paradigmatic derogatory uses, (b) non-paradigmatic derogatory uses, and (c) non-derogatory in-group
uses. Discusses over twenty features of African American Vernacular English (AAVE), suggesting that this speech pattern is distinctive
of working-class African Americans and so is indicative of their racial identity.
Croom, Adam M. “Slurs, Stereotypes, and In-Equality: A Critical Review of “How Epithets and Stereotypes Are Racially
Unequal.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 139–154.
Examines the strengths and weaknesses of a context-insensitive proposal about the relationship between racial slurs and stereotypes
in the workplace.
Čupković, Gordana. “Diachronic Variations of Slurs and Levels of Derogation: On Some Regional, Ethnic and Racial Slurs in
Croatian.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 215–230.
Distinguishes between racial, ethnic, and regional slurs. This classification depends on whether the stereotypical characteristics
targeted involve speech, appearance, character, occupation, place, and religion. Argues that a diachronic analysis of slurs explains how
they can change their semantic features (e.g., they can originate from either descriptive or expressive words, and they can lose their
negative characteristics).
Embrick, David G., and Kasey Henricks. “Two-Faced-Isms: Racism at Work and How Race Discourse Shapes Class Talk and
Gender Talk.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 165–175.
Argues that racial slurs and stereotypes are always judged as negative and derogatory regardless of the context they are used in. They
both function as symbolic resources to exclude minorities from resources and opportunities.
Jackson, Jennifer. “Structural Differentiation and the Poetics of Violence Shaping Barack Obama’s Presidency: A Study in
Personhood, Literacy, and the Improvisation of African-American Publics.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 200–214.
Focuses on two structuring levels: (a) the institutionalization of citizenship and (b) civic literacy though formal education of African
Americans.
Weissbrod, Rachel. “Celebrity Anti-Semitism: A Translation Studies Perspective.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 231–240.
Reports two tendencies of use in this context of journalism: (a) explicitation, accentuation, and intensification; and (b) humorous
framing.
Yoon, Suwon. “Semantic Constraint and Pragmatic Nonconformity for Expressives: Compatibility Condition on Slurs,
Epithets, Anti-Honorifics, Intensifiers, and Mitigators.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 46–69.
Examines combinations of expressives with varying (conflicting) attitudes. Examines the constraints that underpin the compatibility, or
degrees thereof, of multiple expressives such as slurs, epithets, anti-honorifics, intensifiers, and mitigators. The analysis supports Pott’s
(2005) multidimensional account of expressives.
Insults, Taboos, Racist Humor, Non-Verbal Derogation
Neu 2008 introduces the psychology and sociology of insults. Anderson 2018 examines various forms of insults, including slurs as a
paradigmatic case. Milić 2018 gives an objectivist view of when an utterance counts as an insult. Berkovski 2017 advances a
subjectivist view of when something counts as an insult. Allan 2017 examines the conditions under which a behavioral act counts as
insulting. Anderson 2015 surveys philosophical views on racist and sexist humor. DiFranco 2017 covers the nature of iconic non-verbal
pejoratives. Roache 2016 considers the nature and ethics of swearing.
Allan, Keith. “The Pragmeme of Insult and Some Allopracts.” In Pragmemes and Theories of Language Use. Edited by Keith
Allan, Alessandro Capone, and Istvan Kecskes, 69–84. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017.
Argues that the offense arises from perlocutionary effects. Distinguishes between intentional versus unintentional insults and contrasts
insults and banter.
Anderson, Luvell. “Racist Humour.” Philosophy Compass 10.8 (2015): 501–509.
Surveys philosophical views on racist and sexist humor. Asks whether including racial slurs in humor automatically makes it less funny
or unfunny. Asks whether finding a joke funny requires endorsing the stereotypes it expresses. Connects to the literature on testimonial
injustice, which is the denial of credibility to a speaker due to a hearer’s prejudice.
Anderson, Luvell. “Philosophical Investigations of the Taboo of Insult.” In The Oxford Handbook of Taboo Words and
Language. Edited by Keith Allan. New York: Oxford University Press (2018): 233–247.
Argues that both slurs and insults involve interpretive open-endedness that draws the audience into a collaborative process and where
the speaker has latitude in how much is left up to the imaginative abilities of the hearer. Rebuts objections to prohibitionism about the
discursive role of slurs.
Berkovski, Y. S. “A Contextualist Analysis of Insults” International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Modeling and Using
Context (2017): 661–674.
Defends the idea that the offense of insults depends on the addressee’s personal standards of offense. Argues that slurs have a
structure identical to that of insults: namely, having a target that the speaker wishes to demean and seeking to persuade the audience,
through an appeal to their emotions, to help him or her to do so.
DiFranco, Ralph. “Derogation Without Words: On the Power of Non-Verbal Pejoratives.” Philosophical Psychology 30.6 (2017):
784–808.
Argues that iconic non-verbal pejoratives differ from arbitrary non-verbal pejoratives and ritualized animal threat signals (e.g., a wolf’s
snarl), which do not threaten targets through iconographic depiction. Racist caricatures, however, disparage their targets by inviting the
audience to entertain negative images of them. For example, “blackface” performers promulgated an unflattering image of African
Americans by means of make-up, costumes, and vocal impersonations.
Milić, Ivan. “What Counts as an Insult?” Acta Analytica 33.4 (2018): 539–552.
Defines a linguistic act as insulting if (and only if) it is (i) assessed as demeaning to the addressee and (ii) relative to the standard of the
target social group. Argues that the relevant standard to explain offense is an objectivist standard shared by the target group.
Neu, Jerome. Stick and Stones. The Philosophy of Insults. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Defines insults as failures of respect. A key dimension in understanding insults is how to construe the addressee’s state upon being
insulted. Distinguishes between “feeling insulted” and “being insulted.” “Feeling” insulted is not necessarily a sign of being genuinely
insulted.
Roache, Rebecca. “Naughty Words.” Aeon, 2016.
Distinguishes swear words from slurs and argues that the former are more acceptable than the latter, whether used or mentioned.
Explores the nature of swearing in relation to taboos, impoliteness, and breaches of etiquette.
Hate Speech and Social Harm
Slurs are a type of hate speech and thus used to oppress and subordinate targets. This is critical in understanding the kinds of
oppressive acts that slurs are used to perform and the conditions for determining whether they merely cause harm or are constitutive of
harm. Motivating this distinction is critical to making a case for regulating hate speech. This requires showing that slurs do not just harm
within the limits of a specific conversation, but they also alter social norms and strengthen ideologies. Targets are also socially
disempowered by being silenced. This disempowerment is also a feature of hate speech, offhand sexist remarks, and pornography,
among others.
Hate Speech and the Problem of Authority
Slurs and hate speech normalize subordination of targets by shaping their social identities to be powerless. How can speech do this?
Speakers do not always have the authority necessary to subordinate others. One explanation is to connect speech with structurally
oppressive social arrangements. Tirrell 1999 argues that slurs are bully words that draw from systems of oppression, and their harm is
adequately captured in terms of unjust social and discursive practices rather than speakers’ psychology. Tirrell 2012 is concerned with
the role of slurs in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Tirrell 2017 applies a medical conception of toxicity to speech practices. Maitra 2012
distinguishes two notions of authority that are able to explain acts of subordination achieved with informal hate speech. Langton 2015
argues that social norms can arise without special authority by following rules of accommodation. Langton 2018 defines a weaker
notion of authority that is adequate to explain the harm achieved with informal hate speech. McGowan 2019 circumvents the authority
problem with her notion of “covert exercitives.”
Langton, Rae. “How to Get a Norm from a Speech Act.” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 10 (2015): 1–33.
Argues that social norms can arise without special authority by following rules of accommodation. Generalizes the rules of
accommodation to both cases of sustaining preexisting norms and creating new norms such that something that was lacking before is
supplied in the moment. Discusses the implications of norm enactment in relation to anti-Semitic propaganda and pornography.
Langton, Rae. “The Authority of Hate Speech.” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law 3 (2018): 123.
Argues that hate speech and propaganda can gain authority informally via presupposition accommodation. A speaker presupposes
authority. If hearers fail to block this kind of speech, the speaker acquires enough authority to enable them to subordinate—to make
directives legitimating discrimination or exercitives depriving people of rights and power. Proposes a weaker notion of authority relative
to a subject domain, jurisdiction, or comparative rivals.
Maitra, Ishani. “Subordinating Speech.” In Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech. Edited by Ishani Maitra and
Mary Kate McGowan, 94–120. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Argues that ordinary instances of racist speech can be authoritative and thus subordinating targets. Although hate speakers lack the
authority to subordinate or rank targets as inferior, they can nevertheless do so in two ways: (1) by attaining authority “derived” from
someone else’s basic (positional) authority; and (2) by being “licensed” as an authority by their audiences who fail to challenge the
presumed authority.
McGowan, Mary Kate. Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
Chapter 3 distinguishes between standard exercitives and conversational exercitives in terms of their different conditions for success
and the different sorts of permissibility facts enacted. The former require the speaker’s authority, but the latter do not. Argues for a
notion of “standing” (i.e., that participants are socially positioned in having a status conferred by others—and that standing can also be
licensed).
Tirrell, Lynne. “Derogatory Terms: Racism, Sexism, and the Inferential Role Theory of Meaning.” In Language and Liberation:
Feminism, Philosophy, and Language. Edited by Christina Hendricks and Kelly Oliver, 41–79. Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1999.
Provides an inferentialist framework in which slurs license a pattern of inferences governed by three commitments: (1) identificatory
commitments identifying target group; (2) assertional commitments subsuming stereotypes; and (3) expressive commitments about the
value of slurring speech. Discusses the persistence of slurs’ derogatory force in a wide range of contexts and their “reductive
classification” component. Explains hearers’ complicity as a consequence of omitting to challenge bigots. Explains reclamation as
reorganizing the inferential structure associated with a slur to enable targets’ empowerment.
Tirrell, Lynne. “Genocidal Language Games.” In Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech. Edited by Ishani Maitra
and Mary Kate McGowan, 174–221. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Argues that slurs are “action-engendering” and derive their force from systems of oppression and discrimination. Shows how the slurs
used in the Hutu propaganda against Tutsi in the Rwanda genocide help enact power, grant permissions to hate and kill, and rationalize
crime. They have five functions: (a) identifying the target, (b) expressing negative attitudes toward them, (c) licensing inferences from
the imposition of that category, and (d) establishing insider/outsider status.
Tirrell, Lynne. “Toxic Speech. Toward an Epidemiology of Discursive Harm.” Philosophical Topics 45.2 (2017): 139–161.
Argues that the concept of toxicity helps to shed light on the mechanisms by which speech acts and discursive practices can inflict
harm.
Hate Speech and Ideology
Slurs are intricately related to ideology and propaganda. They draw their force from the systems of oppression and subordination they
are tied to and that they promote. Authors seek linguistic mechanisms by which slurs achieve social and political effects. Kukla 2018
develops a speech-act account of the pragmatic and social functions of slurs. Davis and McCready 2020 argues that the power of slurs
derives from their power to invoke complex sociohistorical and ideological assumptions. Stanley 2015 is concerned with the role of slurs
and coded speech (e.g., use of “dog whistles” in propaganda). Saul 2018 defends a view of implicit dog whistles as covert
perlocutionary effects. Saul 2017 examines the noxious effects of Trump’s rhetoric. Cepollaro and Torrengo 2018 is concerned with how
slurs differ from dog whistles. Cepollaro 2017 is concerned with how slurs contribute to spreading discrimination.
Cepollaro, Bianca. “Slurs as the Shortcut of Discrimination.” Rivista di Estetica 64.1 (2017): 53–65.
Shows how the presuppositional analysis of slurs helps explain the spread of discrimination. Explains the complicity and propaganda
power of slurs as an effect of their derogatory content being presented as not open to discussion.
Cepollaro, Bianca, and Giuliano Torrengo. “The Worst and the Best of Propaganda: Symposium on Jason Stanley’s ‘How
Propaganda Works.’” Disputatio (2018): 1–15.
Argues, contra Stanley 2015, that slurs differ from code words such as “welfare queen.” The argument is that for code words the
association between the lexical item and an additional social meaning is not as systematic as it is for slurs.
Davis, Christopher, and ElinMcCready . “The Instability of Slurs.” In Non-Derogatory Uses of Slurs. Edited by Bianca
Cepollaro and Dan Zeman. Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (2020): 63–85.
Argues that the power of slurs relies on background ideological assumptions. Distinguishes slurs’ offense from their derogation.
Discusses some controversial cases of slurring (“Nazi”) and cases of misgendering.
Kukla, Rebecca. “Slurs, Interpellation, and Ideologies.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (2018): 1–26.
Argues that an important function of slurs is “to produce subjects who occupy social identities carved out by pernicious ideologies” (p.
1). Argues that slurs work as a kind of “interpellation” that derogates and subordinates targets, reducing their identity to a generic
identity. Shows how slurs and ideologies work in tandem to constitute and strengthen one another.
Saul, Jennifer. “Dogwhistles, Political Manipulation, and Philosophy of Language.” In New Work on Speech Acts. Edited by
Daniel Fogal, Daniel W. Harris, and Matt Moss, 371–394. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues that the pernicious effects of dog whistles succeed if the intended perlocutionary effects on the audience are not recognized as
intended. These effects are not about propositions which need to be added to the common ground and they also need not be
consciously available to their audience. They can sometimes be blocked.
Saul, Jennifer. “Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump.” Philosophical
Topics 45.2 (2017): 97–116.
Introduces a new linguistic device—so-called racial fig leaf—which is critical to explain the pernicious effects of political discourse.
Racial fig leaf is an additional utterance that provides just enough cover to give reassurance to the audience that the main utterance
(and the speaker who utters it) is not racist. Argues that fig leaves play a central role in shifting norms about what counts as racist.
Stanley, Jason. How Propaganda Works. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015.
Chapter 4 argues that slurs function like dog-whistle code words (e.g., “welfare queen”) in that both are pernicious devices that convey
derogatory content as “not-at-issue.” This makes it more difficult to challenge or cancel since it becomes part of the conversation’s
common ground without being explicitly up for consideration in the way at-issue content is.
Hate Speech and Silencing
A disempowering effect of slurs is the silencing of targets. These papers relate this to silencing effects of hate speech and pornography
and has received a lot of attention in the literature. The following are selective references. Langton 1993 discusses the silencing effects
of pornography in a speech-act frameworks. Hornsby 1995 covers the disempowering effects of silencing. Hornsby and Langton 1998
argues that pornography silences women’s speech. Jacobson 1995 disputes Austin’s claim that performing an illocutionary act requires
uptake and considers the implications for free speech. Bird 2002 is concerned with whether or not the notion of “uptake” is necessary to
understand the kinds of illocutionary acts being performed. Maitra 2009 introduces the notion of “communicative disablement” to explain
the kinds of wrongs produced with pornography and racist hate speech. West 2012 argues that the silencing effects of hate speech
have implications for free speech regulation. Langton 2017 explores the extent of the analogy between pornography and the law.
Antony 2017 raises problems for Langton’s account of pornography as a constitutive act of subordination. McGowan 2003 introduces
the notion of “conversational exercitive” to explain the harms of pornography. McGowan 2017 explores a variety of types of silencing
caused by pornography. Nielsen 2012 addresses the difficulty of responding to hate speech. Lackey 2018 explores the connection
between silence and the duty to object to what we perceive to be false, unwarranted, or harmful. Tanesini 2018 argues that silence can
be used to voice dissent. Tanesini 2018 defends a commitment-based view of assertion in order to make sense of the idea of silencing.
Wieland 2007 is concerned with the problem of authority in explaining the harms of pornography.
Antony, Louise. “Be What I Say: Authority versus Power in Pornography.” In Beyond Speech: Pornography and Analytic
Feminist Philosophy. Edited by Mari Mikkola, 59–88. Oxford University Press, 2017.
Argues, against Langton, that pornography does not constitute subordination: “there is no procedure accepted by women that
constructs a subordinating speech act, and thus no procedure that grants pornographers the authority to subordinate women.” (pp 84)
Argues that the problems that Langton’s account faces in explaining pornography as a constitutive act of subordination derive from
conflating a normative notion of authority and a non-normative notion of power.
Bird, Alexander. “Illocutionary Silencing.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2002): 1–15.
Argues, contra Hornsby and Langton 1998, that uptake is usually not necessary for illocution, nor is it required for the act of refusal that
Hornsby and Langton focus on.
Hornsby, Jennifer. “Disempowered Speech.” Philosophical Topics 23.2 (1995): 127–147.
Argues that silencing is a form of disempowerment since the silenced person cannot do with speech the things that they might have
wanted to. Introduces the notions of “ineffability” and “inaudibility” as complementary aspects of the kinds of wrongs involved in
silencing. Connects silencing to debates about free speech to the extent that a speaker who is silenced is deprived of the benefits that
free speech is supposed to protect.
Hornsby, Jennifer, and Rae Langton. “Free Speech and Illocution.” Legal Theory 4 (1998): 21–37.
A reply to Jacobson 1995. Argues that pornography prevents women from deriving from the benefits of speech that are warranted by
freedom of speech protections. Introduces the notion of “illocutionary disablement” to define speech acts in which a woman’s intended
illocutionary act is not fully successful because it fails to secure uptake.
Jacobson, Daniel. “Freedom of Speech Acts? A Response to Langton.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 24 (1995): 64–79.
Argues that the free speech principle involves locution, not illocution, and claims that the Hornsby-Langton line of argument has
paradoxical consequences that could be avoided by giving up on the indispensability of uptake for performing illocutionary acts.
Lackey, Jennifer. “Silence and Objecting.” In Voicing Dissent. Edited by Casey Rebecca Johnson, 82–96. New York:
Routledge, 2018.
Argues that in order to understand why objecting to false or harmful speech is a luxury for many, we need to expand our current
frameworks to include non-ideal features of communication. This requires making room for concepts such as power, social status, and
oppression.
Langton, Rae. “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22.4 (1993): 293–330.
Argues that speech and pornography can subordinate by unfairly ranking women as inferior, depriving them of rights and powers, and
legitimating discriminatory behavior toward them. Discusses the implications for women’s free speech rights. This is a classic piece that
brought to philosophers’ attention MacKinnon’s 1987 claim that pornography constitutes the subordination of women by distinguishing
between illocutionary and perlocutionary harms and silencing.
Langton, Rae. “Is Pornography Like the Law?” In Beyond Speech: Pornography and Analytic Feminist Philosophy. Edited by
Mari Mikkola, 23–38. Oxford University Press, 2017.
Explores the analogy between pornography and the law. Argues that pornography is like the law in that it has authority to subordinate,
set norms, and silence. However, unlike the law, this authority emerges informal ways, determined by the attitudes of its consumers and
of bystanders, including the state. It is bound to a contextually-determined domain, a jurisdiction, and a contrast class, and it consists of
epistemic authority and practical authority.
Maitra, Ishani. “Silencing Speech.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39.2 (2009): 309–338.
Provides a Gricean analysis of silencing as “communicative disablement” by means of which speakers are unfairly deprived of the
benefits that speech offers. Distinguishes different ways in which speakers may be silenced communicatively and as a moral wrong.
Maitra contrasts this view with Hornsby and Langton 1998 and its speech-act account of silencing as illocutionary disablement. Extends
this argument to discussion of the wrongs of pornography and those of racist hate speech.
McGowan, Mary Kate. “Conversational Exercitives and the Force of Pornography.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31.2 (2003):
155–189.
Raises five objections to Langton 1993 and its speech-act approach to the harms of pornography and argues that these challenges can
be avoided by adopting a notion of “conversational exercitive.” Shows how this can explain covert changes to the bounds of
conversational permissibility. This happens without expressing the content of the permissibility facts being enacted without the speaker
intending to be enacting such facts and without the hearer recognizing such facts.
McGowan, Mary Kate. “On Multiple Types of Silencing.” In Beyond Speech: Pornography and Analytic Feminist Philosophy.
Edited by Mari Mikkola, 39–59. Oxford University Press, 2017.
Discusses four types of silencing that pornography (or its consumption) may cause, and identifies two mechanisms by which
pornography might enact norms that prescribe silencing, and thereby be constitutive of harm.
Nielsen, Laura B. “Power in Public: Reactions, Responses, and Resistance to Offensive Public Speech.” In Speech and Harm:
Controversies over Free Speech. Edited by Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan, 148–173. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012.
Argues that the “more speech” remedy to harmful speech is empirically inadequate in that targets do not talk back. The legal treatment
of such speech contrasts with that of begging. In the case of begging it is easier to respond because the law protects privileged people
from harassment in public, while placing on the less privileged people the heavy choice between responding to or accepting their own
subordination.
Tanesini, Alexandra. “Eloquent Silences and Dissent.” In Voicing Dissent. Edited by Casey Rebecca Johnson, 109–128. New
York: Routledge, 2018.
Argues that eloquent silences are silences that are communicative acts that (a) function as illocutions and (b) are intended to
communicate. They acquire their eloquence through defying standing expectations and thus serve as acts of dissent. Describes some
features of eloquent silences that explain their effectiveness, in some contexts, in expressing dissent.
Tanesini, Alexandra. “Silencing and Assertion.” In Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Edited by Sanford Goldberg. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2020.
Argues that successful asserting requires the speaker to undertake a twofold commitment: an accountability and answerability
commitment. Speakers are silenced in their attempts to assert because despite their attempts to undertake those commitments, they
are unable to make themselves accountable and/or answerable for the contents they express.
West, Caroline. “Words That Silence? Freedom of Expression and Racist Hate Speech.” In Speech and Harm: Controversies
Over Free Speech. Edited by Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan, 222–250. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Argues that if racist hate speech silences other speech by interfering with its production/distribution, comprehension, and consideration,
then it can be taken to undermine freedom of speech. This should offer special considerations against permitting hate speech.
Wieland, Nelly. “Linguistic Authority and Convention in a Speech Act Analysis of Pornography.” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 85.3 (2007): 435–456.
Recasts the Hornsby-Langton line of argument in terms of linguistic conventions. Argues that this way of conceiving their argument
solves the so-called Authority Problem but risks an unwitting defense of a rapist’s lack of mens area, which is an intolerable result.
Undoing the Harms of Hate Speech
How should we resist and remedy hate speech? We can identify mechanisms that block or undo the harm. We also look for models that
explain how these mechanisms work. McGowan 2018 argues that mechanisms explaining how speech causes harm can be employed
to enact egalitarian norms. Langton 2018 argues that the harms of hate speech can be undone by removing the authority that such
speech presupposes. Tirrell 2018 develops a parallel with epidemiological models to explain ways of inoculating the harms of toxic
speech. Russell 2019 considers how speaking up can undermine subordination. Lepoutre 2019 defends an account of counter-speech.
Rahman 2015 considers strategies of deflecting the negativity carried by uses of slurs. Sbisà 2007 is concerned with the possibility of
undoing speech acts. Caponetto 2018 explores the conditions under which we can undo certain speech acts.
Caponetto, Laura. “Undoing Things With Words.” Synthese (2018): 1–16.
Discusses three main ways in which speech acts can be undone (i.e., annulment, retraction, and amendment) and argues that only
illocutionary acts are susceptible to being undone.
Langton, Rae. “Blocking as Counter-Speech.” In New Work on Speech Acts. Edited by Daniel Fogal, Daniel Harris, and Matt
Moss, 155–175. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
Argues that hearers can block the default process of accommodation involved in hate speech by removing the speaker’s authority and
undermining the force of their speech acts. Blocking can “retroactively undo” the harms by bringing what is implicit into the open and
making the “back-door” speech acts misfire. Discusses barriers or handicaps on blocking—epistemic, structural, and normative—which
make blocking possible but difficult (or not possible at all).
Lepoutre, Maxime. “Can ‘More Speech’ Counter Ignorant Speech?” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16.3 (2019): 155–
192.
Argues that it is difficult to reverse conversational norms enacted by “ignorant speech” (i.e., speech that disseminates or promotes
falsehoods) because of the asymmetric pliability of such norms. The proposed account is based on a twofold claim: (i) positive counter-
speech is generally more effective than negative counter-speech; and (ii) counter-speech should be conceived of as a strategy that
operates diachronically, as it may preempt as well as follow ignorant utterances.
McGowan, Mary Kate. “Responding to Harmful Speech: More Speech, Counter Speech, and the Complexity of Language Use.”
In Voicing Dissent. Edited by Casey Rebecca Johnson, 182–199. New York: Routledge, 2018.
Claims that counter-speech cannot simply undo the effects of harmful speech, since complete reversals of the conversational score are
not possible. Argues that just as speech can covertly enact harmful norms, it can also covertly enact egalitarian norms and
surreptitiously reshape the social world for the better.
Rahman, Jacquelyn. “Missing the Target: Group Practices That Launch and Deflect Slurs.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 70–
81.
Examines strategies that some target groups have developed to lessen the negative effects of slurring.
Russell, Gillian. “Subordinating Speech and Speaking Up.” In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language. Edited by Ernie
Lepore and David Sosa, 178–207. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
Considers five ways in which speaking up can be effective against acts of subordination: (a) refusing to accommodate, (b) broadening
the conversation, (c) questioning the context set, (d) adding equality to the context set, and (e) preemptively subordinating the
subordinators.
Sbisà, Marina. “How to Read Austin.” Pragmatics 17 (2007): 461–473.
First to discuss the possibility of undoing speech acts in an Austinian framework.
Tirrell, Lynne. “Toxic Speech: Inoculations and Antidotes.” In Language, Power, and Society, supplement. The Southern
Journal of Philosophy 56.S1 (2018): 116S–144S.
Develops the analogy between remedies for toxic speech and an epidemiological model of inoculations and antidotes in terms of
individual protections and collective actions seeking “herd immunity.” Among various strategies of “more speech,” the most promising is
that of challenging the expressive commitments underlying toxic speech. This requires a meta-level challenge to the viability and value
of the mode of discourse itself and promises to improve social practices.
Legal Regulation of Hate Speech
The harm in hate speech, including slurs, raises questions of legal regulation. The focus is on clarifying the notion of harm in speech
such that it requires a legal response. To make progress we must define what hate speech is and the phenomena in its scope. For
example, the notion of “fighting words” is legally protected. But hate speech has been seen to clash with one’s right to freedom of
opinion and expression. Another approach to arguing for the necessity of a legal response to hate speech has been pursued by critical
race theorists who have focused on the harms and oppression experienced by the victims.
Harm in Speech and Free Speech
The challenge in making a case for legal regulation is demonstrating that hate speech does not just cause harm by merely changing
people’s beliefs and attitudes but causes harm that requires legal protection. The challenge is even harder to meet, especially given the
First Amendment protections for free speech in the United States. Maitra and McGowan 2012 is a collection of papers on oppressive
speech and its relationship to debates about freedom of speech. Waldron 2014 analyzes the harms caused by hate speech and
defends legal regulation of hate speech in the United States. Barendt 2019 is concerned with the question of whether hate speech
causes or constitutes harm. Brown 2017a and Brown 2017b provide a definition of “hate speech” and consider possible remedies.
Altman 1993 argues that the wrongs produced with hate speech, including slurs, involve treating the targets as moral subordinates.
Maitra and McGowan 2010 is concerned with the implications of racist speech on free speech debates. Hornsby 2014 argues that
justifications of free speech relate to the value of illocutionary acts.
Altman, Andrew. “Liberalism and Campus Hate Speech: A Philosophical Examination.” Ethics 103.2 (1993): 302–317.
Defends a middle ground between opponents of all hate speech regulation and proponents of sweeping regulation. This requires
recognizing that hate speech involving racist, sexist, or homophobic slurs constitutes subordination. This wrongs the targets by treating
them as moral subordinates. Slurs are thus not only an expression of hatred or contempt but also a mechanism of putting the targets in
their place and treating them as having inferior moral standing.
Barendt, Eric. “What is the Harm of Hate Speech?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22.3: (2019): 539–553.
Argues for a weak consequentialist interpretation of Waldron’s argument to the effect that hate speech causes harm. Hate speech may
be banned because of its harmful tendencies to endanger targets’ dignity and social cohesion.
Brown, Alexander. “What is Hate Speech? Part I: The Myth of Hate.” Law and Philosophy 36.4 (2017a): 419–468.
Provides a conceptual analysis of the ordinary term “hate speech.” Rejects the assumption that hate speech has a single meaning, in
favor of an analysis that allows for semantic multiplicity. Rejects that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate must be part of the
essential nature of hate speech. This enables phenomena to qualify as hate speech but need not involve the literal meaning of “hate.”
Brown, Alexander. “What is Hate Speech? Part II: Family Resemblances.” Law and Philosophy 36.5 (2017b): 561–613.
Argues that hate speech is better analyzed as a family resemblance concept. This means that remedies of hate speech should be
sensitive to the heterogeneous collection of expressive phenomena that fall under the category of hate speech.
Hornsby, Jennifer. “Free Speech and Hate Speech: Language and Rights.” In Normatività Fatti Valori. Edited by Rosaria Egidi,
Massimo Dell’Utri, and Mario De Caro, 297–310. Macerata, Italy: Quodlibet, 2014.
Claims that justifications of free speech relate to the value of illocutionary acts not just locutionary acts. Argues against the major
reasons behind the libertarian idea that actual serious harm cannot accrue from the presence of hate speech in a community where
freedom of speech prevails.
Maitra, Ishani, and Mary Kate McGowan. eds. Speech and Harm: Controversies Over Free Speech. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012.
A collection of contributions focusing on oppressive speech and its implications for free speech debates. The primary concern is
defining what makes speech harmful, what kinds of speech are harmful, what kinds of harm it produces, how speech brings about these
harms, what remedies are available, and whether or not harmful speech should be regulated. The distinction between causal and
constitutive harm is critical to arguments about regulating hate speech.
Maitra, Ishani, and Mary Kate McGowan. “On Racist Hate Speech and the Scope of a Free Speech Principle.” The Canadian
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 23.2 (2010): 343–372.
Argues for the claim that significantly obligation-enacting utterances should not be covered by the First Amendment and that racist
speech acts may fall outside the scope of a free speech principle.
Waldron, Jeremy. The Harm in Hate Speech. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Argues that the harm of hate speech consists in compromising the dignity of targets. This is the basic social standing that entitles
everyone to equal treatment in society. It considers the legal implications of hate speech by contrasting the European and the US legal
system regarding free speech regulations and whether or not they should be legally regulated as incitement to “hate crimes.”
Critical Race Theory
Work in critical race theory has advanced arguments for the necessity of a legal response to hate speech. The focus has been to draw
attention to various forms of oppression from the viewpoint of the targets and discuss the implications of regulating oppressive speech
for free speech debates. Matsuda, et al. 1993 is a collection of essays in critical race theory that argues for the recognition of hate
speech as a social problem that requires legal regulation. Delgado 1993 connects racist speech to racism, power, and structural
subordination. Matsuda 1993 provides a narrow definition of actionable racist speech which requires a legal response. Lawrence 1993
argues that racist hate speech causes social harms such as racial discrimination, racial violence, subordination and disempowerment of
targets. Crenshaw 1993 is concerned with the question of intersectionality in the case of women of color. Delgado and Stefancic 2004 is
a companion volume to Matsuda, et al. 1993, which extends the various kinds of harms of hate speech and connects slurs to systems
of oppression and discrimination.
Crenshaw, Kimberle W. “Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew.” In Words that Wound: Critical
Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and First Amendment. Edited by Mary T. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence, Richard Delgado,
and Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, 111–132. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.
Examines the question of intersectionality of race and gender subordination in the context of violence against women of color.
Discusses the arguments from defense and prosecution in the case of the misogynistic interpretation of the lyrics of 2 Live Crew.
Delgado, Richard. “Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling.” In Words That Wound:
Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and First Amendment. Edited by Mary T. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence, Richard
Delgado, and Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, 89–110. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.
Draws on insights from psychology, sociology, and political theory to explain the harms of hate speech and the tensions between legal
remedies and the first amendment. An earlier version appeared in 1982 in Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review 17:133–181.
Delgado, Richard, and Jean Stefancic. Understanding Words That Wound. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004.
A companion volume to Words That Wound (1993), which extends the various kinds of harms of hate speech, including immediate
psychological harms and long-term structural harms. Argues that slurs conjure up entire histories of discrimination.
Lawrence, Charles. “If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus.” In Words that Wound: Critical Race
Theory, Assaultive Speech, and First Amendment. Edited by Mary T. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence, Richard Delgado, and
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, 53–88. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.
Argues that racist hate speech causes social harms such as racial discrimination, racial violence, subordination, and disempowerment
of targets. Examines the injury and exclusion experienced by black students in the wake of the Ujamaa incident.
Matsuda, Mari T. “Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story.” In Words That Wound: Critical Race
Theory, Assaultive Speech, and First Amendment. Edited by Mary T. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence, Richard Delgado, and
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, 17–52. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.
Argues that racist speech subordinates historically oppressed groups by conveying a message of racial inferiority. Proposes a principle
of anti-subordination to determine when hate speech conflicts with principles informing the first amendment. An earlier version
appeared in 1989 in Michigan Law Review 87.8: 2320–2381.
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Discusses the implications of regulating hate speech for the right to freedom of speech, especially in the United States. Seeks to
eliminate oppression and challenge inequalities and social/institutional practices. The methodology is a so-called outsider jurisprudence
in that it prioritizes the experience of the victims.
Empirical and Experimental Findings
Discussions of slurs have mostly been theoretical in the sense of providing the mechanisms by which they achieve their intended
effects. Recently, however, more attention has been paid to empirical evidence of both qualitative and quantitative analyses of certain
use patterns of slurs, the experimental work of the perception of offense that slurs cause, as well as the self-empowering effect that re-
appropriation enables. Cepollaro, et al. 2019 empirically investigates the variation in offense between slurs and insults across different
syntactic positions. Spotorno and Bianchi 2015 discusses the pros and cons of online versus offline empirical studies. Panzeri and
Carrus 2016 examines experimentally whether the offensive component of slurs is non-displaceable. Galinsky, et al. 2013 tests
empirically a reappropriation model based on the empowering effects of self-labeling. Carnaghi and Maass 2007 investigates the
automatic reactions between derogatory group labels versus category labels. Greenberg and Pyszczynski 1985 argues that
overhearing derogatory ethnic labels can lead to negative evaluations of the target. Greenberg, et al. 1987 replicates the negative effect
of overhearing slurs in courtroom settings. Saucier, et al. 2015 reports findings of different categories of slurs that produce varying
levels of perceived offensiveness and any number of aggressive responses. O’Dea, et al. 2015 examines the variation in perception of
offense. Jay and Jay 2015 measures taboo word fluency and connects taboo word use and personality traits. Henry, et al. 2014 argues
that cultural taboos emerge concerning insults against low-status groups. Technau 2018 empirically investigates the frequency of
different modes of use across slurs, pejoratives, and expressives. Fasoli, et al. 2015 examines how gendered slurs affect their victims.
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Tests the hypothesis that category labels and derogatory group labels equally activate stereotypes. Finds that for heterosexual
participants derogatory labels activate less favorable associations than those activated by category labels. By contrast, homosexual
participants reacted in the same way to category and derogatory labels. Heterosexuals are in particular negatively affected by
derogatory group labels.
Cepollaro, Bianca, Simone Sulpizio, and Claudia Bianchi. “How Bad Is It to Report a Slur? An Empirical Investigation.”
Journal of Pragmatics 146 (2019): 32–42.
Provides empirical support that slurs offend more than insults in isolation but are less offensive when they are predicated of targets.
This is because slurs have a descriptive content denoting group membership, in addition to the negative evaluation shared with insults.
This is taken to be compatible with hybrid accounts but not with expressivist and speech-act theories. Also finds that slurs and insults
are less offensive for indirect reports rather than direct uses and argues that this goes against prohibitionism.
Fasoli, Fabio, Andrea Carnaghi, and Maria Paola Paladino. “Social Acceptability of Sexist Derogatory and Sexist Objectifying
Slurs Across Contexts.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 98–107.
Empirically tests the variation in offense of gendered slurs when uttered by men toward women, both in work contexts and intimate
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Galinsky, Adam D., Cynthia S. Wang, Jennifer A. Whitson, Eric M. Anicich, Kurt Hugenberg, and Galen V. Bodenhausen. “The
Reappropriation of Stigmatizing Labels: The Reciprocal Relationship Between Power and Self-Labeling.” Psychological
Science 24.10 (2013): 2020–2029.
Argues that group power increases targets’ willingness to label themselves with a derogatory term: targets feel more powerful after self-
labeling, and observers perceived their group as more powerful. Increased perceptions of power help attenuate the stigma attached to
the slur term after self-labeling.
Greenberg, Jeff, and Tom Pyszczynski. “The Effect of an Overheard Ethnic Slur on Evaluations of the Target: How to Spread a
Social Disease.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 21 (1985): 61–72.
Confirms empirically that ethnic slurs activate negative schemata about members of a targeted minority group. For example, when a
black debater lost the debate, the ethnic slur would lead to lower evaluations of his skill than had he been white and lost.
Greenberg, Jeff, Tom Pyszczynski, and Shari L. Kirkland. “Further Evidence of the Deleterious Effects of Overheard
Derogatory Ethnic Labels: Derogation Beyond the Target.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 13.2 (1987): 216–227.
Replicates the effect found by Greenberg and Pyszczynski 1985 in a courtroom setting where the defense attorney and defendant are
evaluated differently depending on whether or not they are associated with the target. When the defense attorney is black, and the
defendant white, the attorney was referred to as “shyster” or “nigger”. The white defendant was evaluated negatively when defended by
a black who was the target of slurs.
Henry, P. J., Sarah E. Butler, and Mark J. Brandt. “The Influence of Target Group Status on the Perception of the Offensiveness
of Group-Based Slurs.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 53 (2014): 185–192.
Argues that the perception that a group is of lower status in society is associated with the perceived offense of insults targeting that
group. People perceive slurs against a low status group as extremely offensive, which is mediated by the expectations that low-status
targets would be emotionally reactive to the insult.
Jay, Kristin L., and Timothy B. Jay. “Taboo Word Fluency and Knowledge of Slurs and General Pejoratives: Deconstructing
the Poverty-of-Vocabulary Myth.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 251–259.
Argues that expressives and pejoratives are found to be generated at higher rates (and much earlier) than slurs. Female-related slurs
(e.g., “bitch”) are generated at high rates, suggesting that they transitioned from sexist slurs to general pejoratives or are used as
expressives. Taboo fluency is positively correlated with neuroticism and negatively correlated with agreeableness and
conscientiousness.
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Labels: Derogation Beyond the Target.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 13.2 (1987): 216–227.
Replicates the effect found by Greenberg and Pyszczynski 1985 in a courtroom setting where the defense attorney and defendant are
evaluated differently depending on whether or not they are associated with the target. When the defense attorney is black, and the
defendant white, the attorney was referred to as “shyster” or “nigger.” The white defendant was evaluated negatively when defended by
a black person who had been the target of slurs.
O’Dea, Conor J., Stuart S. Miller, Emma B. Andres, Madelyn H. Ray, and Donald A. Saucier. “Out of Bounds: Factors Affecting
the Perceived Offensiveness of Racial Slurs.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 155–164.
Argues that slurs used among friends are perceived as less offensive than between strangers. Equally, the appropriated use “nigga” is
perceived as less offensive. Ratings of offense are correlated with individual differences relating to the justification and suppression of
prejudice. Finally, individuals observing uses of slurs are more or less offended depending on the context and their beliefs about the
social appropriateness of expressing prejudice.
Panzeri, Francesca, and Simone Carrus. “Slurs and Negation.” Phenomenology and Mind 11 (2016): 170–180.
Provides experimental findings that offense survives in conditionals and questions but diminishes in indirect reports and is almost
nullified under negation. The reason why negated slurs are rated as not offensive is that negation is interpreted as metalinguistic. These
findings are taken to support a pragmatic approach of slurs in line with presuppositional accounts.
Saucier, Donald A., Derrick F. Till, Stuart S. Miller, Conor J. O’Dea, and Emma Andres. “Slurs Against Masculinity: Masculine
Honor Beliefs and Men’s Reactions to Slurs.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 108–120.
Discusses empirical evidence that men respond with physical aggression when targeted with slurs. Suggests that male beliefs about
honor are associated with the perception of slurs as offensive and their likelihood of responding physically, especially for slurs that
directly challenge their masculinity.
Spotorno, Nicola, and Claudia Bianchi. “A Plea for an Experimental Approach on Slurs.” Language Sciences 52 (2015): 241–
250.
Argues that empirical studies are critical to illuminate theoretical debates such as the dispute between content based versus non–
content based, and the echoic approach to slurs. Suggests that a useful experimental investigation of slurs is the domain of cognitive
and affective neuroscience, in particular the investigation of how the human mind handles negative stimuli.
Technau, Bjön. “Going Beyond Hate Speech: The Pragmatics of Ethnic Slur Terms.” Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 14.1 (2018):
25–43.
Argues that slurs are more frequently used in contexts among friends than enemies. Distinguishes between hate speech as the central
use of slurs, and other pejorative uses (mobbing, insulting), parasitic uses (banter, appropriation, comedy, youth language), neutral
mention (academics, PC), and unaware uses.
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